

OUTSIDE THE BALLOT BOX

PRECONDITIONS FOR ELECTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 2005/6



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OSISA
Open Society Initiative
for Southern Africa



People unlimited

HiVOS



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ANGOLA

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LANDMINES OF DEMOCRACY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE LEGACY OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN ANGOLA

NUNO VIDAL

From socialism to pluralism

From the colonial era until the present, Angola has largely been under authoritarian rule. The nationalist war against the Portuguese (1961-1975) promised freedom, but independence in 1975 marked the beginning of a civil war with major foreign involvement right from the start. With few interruptions, the war lasted for almost 27 years. It came to an end in February 2002 when the rebel leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita), Jonas Savimbi, was killed in action.

From 1975 to 1977, there was a period of relative freedom in Angola. However, in 1977 an aborted coup resulted in a major purge with massive killings all over the country. The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) established an authoritarian and repressive one-party socialist regime. Among others, a feared apparatus of state security was placed in charge of political repression. Non-state media were closed and the right to association was limited to mass organisations of the MPLA.¹

The judicial system became 'militarised', juxtaposing civilian and military courts with the ability to impose heavy penalties, including the death penalty (mainly for political and security crimes). The judiciary was politically dependent and operated under the direct influence of the party and ultimately of the president. A culture of fear, intimidation and repression became entrenched.²

The priority given to defence and internal security did not allow any room for civil society to emerge and impeded the development of any kind of 'democratic institutions' or any sense of transparency and accountability.³ Violations of human rights by both sides of the conflict as well as impunity for perpetrators of these crimes were frequent occurrences.⁴

With no freedom of expression or any civil society or legal opposition allowed, inefficiency and corruption thrived. The increasing intensity of the war in the 1980s reinforced the whole system by justifying (sometimes excusing) the decline in public services, justifying repression and authoritarianism, supporting centralisation and concentration of power, disrupting internal production that resulted in increasing economic dependency on oil revenues and by intensifying social fragmentation.⁵

In 1991, Unita and the government entered into a peace agreement – Bicesse – setting the pace for the first multi-party elections in 1992. The constitution was revised in 1991 to consecrate the new democratic state⁶ and a new legal framework opened up space for the emergence of opposition political parties and so-called civil society organisations.⁷

The MPLA attempted to influence some of the newly emerging non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private media, especially the new private commercial radio stations, which started broadcasting in 1992, and which

were, without exception, controlled by the party in power through their Boards of Directors.⁸ It became clear, however, that it was not possible to control every new organisation and that the old days of monopolistic control over politics and society was over. The number of political parties and NGOs increased steadily. A forum was required and established to articulate and coordinate national NGOs – Fonga (*Forum das ONGs Angolanas/Forum of Angolan NGOs*) – and international NGOs, organised by Conga (*Comité das Organizações Não Governamentais em Angola/Committee of NGOs in Angola*).⁹

Immediately after the 1992 elections, Unita refused to accept the electoral results and the country was again plunged into civil war. Military and political space opened to the opposition, but civil society contracted. However, it did not shut down completely. Since the regime had started to allow some room for public and political discourse after the revised constitution, it was very difficult to return to the starting point.

In 1994 a new peace protocol was signed in Lusaka and again civil society gained in strength and space. There was a boom in the establishment of private newspapers¹⁰ and the state monopoly on radio broadcasting came to an end in 1997 with the re-opening of the Catholic Church's Rádio Ecclésia in Luanda (closed in 1977). A labour union federation emerged in 1996 (CGSILA – Federation of Free and Independent Angolan Labour Unions), ending the monopolistic status of the MPLA's federation (UNTA – National Union of Angolan Workers), allowing representation of other independent labour unions (e.g. teachers, Sinprof – Sindicato dos Professores/Union of Professors and SJA – *Sindicato dos Jornalistas de Angola/Union of Journalists*).

The newly established media began expressing strong criticism of the government by denouncing extreme poverty, lack of water and electricity, disruption of the education, health and judicial systems, thriving corruption, police and army violence against civilians, and other issues.¹¹

Unused to such aggressive criticism, the government at times reacted violently by intimidating and arresting journalists. Under suspicious circumstances, offices of newspapers burnt down or were pillaged (e.g. *Agora* and *Comércio & Actualidade* in 1998). Shocking murders of journalists also occurred during these years, including Ricardo de Mello in 1995 (working for *Imparcial Fax* and researching top level state corruption) and António Casimiro in 1996 (a correspondent of state-television in Cabinda).

Grasping the internal and international political significance of civil society, the regime invested in a 'parallel civil society', comprising organisations such as the President's foundation (*Fesa – Fundação Eduardo dos Santos/Eduardo dos Santos Foundation*) created in 1996¹² and the Lwini Social Solidarity Fund of the First Lady, Ana Paula dos Santos. Both organisations work to rehabilitate the political image of the president by selectively delivering services that should be delivered by the State and using social bonus funds from oil and other international companies.

Besides a myriad of small-scale military incidents, the Lusaka Protocol was partially implemented until 1998, when the government decided to suspend the protocol due to Unita's systematic non-compliance with the agreement.

The war that resumed again resulted in another contraction of the political and civil space that had opened during the 1994-1998 period. Political pressure

on the private media was reinforced through state security and judicial activity, which resulted in several arrests and lawsuits against journalists.¹³ A multitude of opposition political parties had to face the challenge of internal factions contesting the legitimacy of their respective leaders – the so-called phenomenon of *Renovadas* (renewal movements inside the opposition parties) – which, according to all opposition leaders affected by such phenomena, were instigated and sponsored by the MPLA to foment division and weakness.¹⁴ These factions had a detrimental effect on the opposition in general and strongly affected their political ability and credibility.

Despite several attempts by the international community and Angolan social movements for a negotiated peace settlement (e.g. the *Pro Pace Movement*¹⁵), a firm decision was made by the MPLA that no concessions would be made and that a military solution would be sought. The MPLA achieved this aim when Savimbi was killed in February 2002. The cease fire and the Memorandum of Luena (April 2002) was signed by a victorious MPLA and a defeated Unita without any external or internal participation – an unbalanced relationship of forces that would from then on characterise the Angolan ‘democratic multi-party system’.

Peace and pluralism without democracy: the maintenance of a party-state character

After the Luena Peace Memorandum it was generally expected that another rapid opening up of space for civil society and political opposition would take place, as had occurred after the Bicesse (1991-1992) and again during the first stage of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol (1994-1998). However, more than four years after the Peace Memorandum, the presidency and the MPLA still retain tight control over the state apparatus and its resources, while significantly restricting the political and civil space of opposition parties and civil society organisations.

Elected in 1992 for a four-year period, the national assembly has remained in place until now without a renewed mandate. General elections have been expected since 2004 and currently 2007 is still a possible date, depending on how the process of electoral registration evolves.

The MPLA is well advanced in its preparation for elections. A massive campaign has been launched all over the country to recruit new members¹⁶ and the party’s base structures are being revitalised and reorganised. Traditional authorities have been politically seduced with gifts and respect offered during official political visits to the provinces and at national conferences on the importance of traditional authorities.¹⁷ Major investments are being made in infrastructure using new and more favourable oil-backed loans such as the one from China.¹⁸ The president and the party are committed to the conclusion of several major public works before elections.¹⁹ This strategy has been described by some sectors of civil society as promoting growth without development and furthermore that it will not reduce the economy’s dependence on oil. As argued by a prominent Angolan academic and economist, oil still represents 98% of Angola’s foreign exchange export revenues, 75% of tax revenues and 57% of GDP, but only 1% of employment.²⁰

The legal framework has been restructured as much as possible prior to elections to suit the political strategy of the party and the interests of those in power (e.g. the Land Law, the Law on Territorial Organisation and Urbanism and the Oil Law and, if possible, the Constitution²¹). As occurred prior to the 1992 elections the MPLA assured an overwhelming majority of members in the National Electoral Council (the institution responsible for the organisation, direction and supervision of the entire electoral process). The electoral register has been illicitly regulated through the Council of Ministers, creating new electoral organs such as 'executive commissions' (with members exclusively appointed by the majority party) to take over responsibilities initially attributed to the National Electoral Council and therefore assuring absolute control over the registration process by the MPLA.²²

Confusion between the state and MPLA structures remains. As an example, some ministers are MPLA central committee members and several provincial governors are MPLA first provincial secretaries. Municipal and communal administrators also hold party and state portfolios and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between their party and state activities insofar as party events mobilise state logistics and vice-versa. It is very common to watch party members inaugurating public infrastructure financed with public money in ceremonies where state and party symbols are often mixed (the MPLA flag is very similar to the flag of the Republic). Such events are manipulated by the state media in order to convey as much political credit as possible to the party in power.²³

The party in power controls the state media and constrains the private media. National television and radio broadcasting is a state monopoly.²⁴ Private weekly newspapers, with circulations in the low thousands, only distribute in Luanda. According to the Angolan journalist, João Paulo N'Ganga, a former chief editor of the newspaper *Folha 8*:

... the country is still today and basically ... Luanda, concentrating the press distribution (state and private) and harbouring *Rádio Eclésia* [Catholic Church radio; the only relatively independent radio station] ... Following the colonial development model, the coast (i.e. Luanda, Benguela and Lubango) has a privileged access to information in relation to the country's interior ... The only daily newspaper in the country, *Jornal de Angola* (Journal of Angola), circulates 20 000 copies for a population of 12-13 million people; there are eight private weekly newspapers with 8000-9000 copies each ... In practice there is a quasi-state monopoly in terms of production and dissemination of information.²⁶

Opposition parties find it difficult to access the state media, experiencing censorship through manipulated reporting and editorial alignment of news that virtually ignores them while giving full coverage to the MPLA. The government has been able to block *Rádio Eclésia* from broadcasting outside of Luanda and continues to intimidate journalists into practising self-censorship while bribing some and co-opting others into the state media.²⁵ As also stressed by the previously quoted João Paulo N'Ganga:

As far as freedom of information and expression is concerned there is still a big discrepancy between constitutionally consecrated rights and practice. Beyond

legislation what really exists is a 'licence for expression' and not 'freedom of expression' or press freedom; and we from the private press know that these licences can be suspended at any time and without warning. The media is still in its early stages and the main objective is still the necessity to ensure the right to freedom of expression.

Our media is controlled and restricted, probably as a result of the previous mono party regime, which stubbornly survives in practice. On the one hand, we have the state media of a propaganda type, manipulated by the party in power, impeding criticism and new ideas, sometimes in disguise, sometimes openly and sometimes even resorting to coercion. On the other hand, we have the private media trying to resist the official discourse of the party-state and its dogma, but usually accused of anti-patriotism. Between the private and the state media there are also some inter-penetration deriving not only from the permanent attempts of infiltration by the party in power, but also from the limited number of journalists in the market. Sometimes this factor is also an obstacle to the emancipation of the private media

... the country lives off several licences so that a democratic system can exist de jure but not de facto.²⁶

A recent example of this difficult operational context for the media was the death threat made by Miguel de Carvalho, Director of the Angolan News Agency (ANGOP), against a journalist.²⁷ Despite this fact, the President later appointed Miguel de Carvalho to the position of Deputy Minister of Social Communication. More recently, the Minister of the Interior, Roberto Leal Monteiro N'Gongo, threatened *Rádio Ecclésia* with an "indictment for the crime of espionage against the state security."²⁸

An audit of the first 100 days of the new press law was recently presented by Cornélio Bento, a member of the Media Institute of Southern Africa in Angola (Misa-Angola). He denounced the occurrence of several violations to press freedom and freedom of expression with the knowledge and acceptance of the state institution that was supposed to defend the rights of journalists – the National Council for Social Communication (*Conselho Nacional da Comunicação Social – CNCS*):

... this organ does not represent or defend journalists and seems to be manipulated by political power ... even the public media violates the journalists' rights, such as *Jornal de Angola*, accepting articles insulting journalists of the private media, but signed with pseudonyms that conceal the true identity of their authors ... the press law per se will not put an end to the dark moments experienced by our journalists ... and still has a penal charge that is too heavy for journalists.²⁹

Referring to the most recent killings of two journalists in July 2006, the President of the Angolan Union of Journalists (SJA), Avelino Miguel, said he thought the sudden surge of violence was part of a strategy to intimidate the media in the run-up to the next elections, and that press freedom in Angola is still severely limited by the state's near monopoly of the media and by overly strict defamation laws.³⁰

The Angolan judicial system is still politically dependant on the president and the MPLA. The president has significant powers of appointment in the judiciary, including the power to appoint Supreme Court judges without confirmation by the national assembly. There are several reports where political pressure from the presidency affected the outcome of cases.³¹ Moreover, there is still a dual and confused judicial system – civil and military³² – that contributes to the maintenance of an authoritarian and feared character of justice in politically sensitive issues. As mentioned by an Angolan human rights activist:

It is well known that we have a precarious judicial system full of deficiencies, some of which derive from the anachronism of several laws framing the Angolan justice system, namely the Penal Code, the Penal Process Code, the Law on the Unified Justice System and the Law of Preventive Arrest, to mention but a few. In ten years our Ministry of Justice has not been able to reform even one law essential to the cause of justice, and it is also regrettable that the Bar of Angolan Lawyers has contributed so little to this matter. Several Procurators of Justice appointed by the President did not care to change the General Procurator Organic Law (still communist and anti-democratic) and it is also dramatic that the National Assembly did not care to reform the most important juridical tools for a State of Law. Finally we must also regret that neither the Chief of Government nor the successive Prime Ministers cared for the state of justice in this country.

What democracy and State of Law do we want with a judicial system so tremendously debilitated? What independence do judges have with miserable salaries and lack of supporting working conditions? What respect for the human being and his rights do we want to cultivate if our co-citizens are piled into jails and police stations in unacceptable conditions, lacking food, medical assistance and usually victims of violence?³³

Directly or indirectly, the regime exercises a tight grip over the economy in both the public and the private sector. The previous political dominance over the public sector was extended to the private sector as soon as the transition to a market economy began in the early nineties.³⁴ Privatisation throughout the nineties favoured the protégées of the regime and today the most profitable and politically crucial private industries function in an oligarchic manner (e.g. banks, insurance, communications and diamonds.)³⁵

In order to ensure peace and significant electoral participation in the enclave of Cabinda (producing approximately half of Angola's daily oil production), the government initiated peace negotiations with separatist movements in 2005. In 2004 the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (*Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda – Flec*), the Catholic Church, and the Mpalabanda Civic Association (c.f. infra) set up the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (*Forum Cabindense para o Diálogo – FCD*, headed by Bento Bembe) to enter into dialogue with the government for peace in Cabinda. In exchange for peace, political and economic autonomy, which recognises the cultural specificity of Cabinda, a Memorandum of Understanding for Peace and Development between the government and

the FCD was signed on July 15, 2006, establishing five crucial principles for the transition to peace: amnesty for rebel fighters, the immediate cessation of hostilities, the demilitarisation of the Cabindan forces under the supervision of the FCD, the reduction of the Angolan military presence in Cabinda and the reintegration of the FCD's members into the Angolan military and government. This agreement was complemented by the signing of an ultimate ceasefire agreement on July 19, 2006.³⁶

In view of this agreement it seemed that the government had finally solved the problem of Cabinda and that a successful ceasefire would allow oil companies to engage in land-drilling operations. The US State department supported the peace process and encouraged massive electoral participation of Cabindan voters in the next election.³⁷ However, the legitimacy of the memorandum was contested right from the start. Even before the agreement was signed, the FCD was abandoned by Flec and Mpalabanda was contesting the negotiation terms (e.g. independence was ruled out and the degree of autonomy was not clear given the restraints imposed by the constitution). The leader of Flec, Nzita Tiago, and a prominent Catholic leader in Cabinda, Raul Taty, were among the most vocal opponents of the deal (the Catholic Church, a major force in Cabinda, refused to join the FCD right from the start). Both men made it clear that they would not support the initiative as they rejected Bento Bembe's authority and deplored the lack of inclusivity in the process.

The IMF, the World Bank, the EU and Western democracies in general gradually relaxed their pressure on the Angolan government for more transparency and respect for human rights. This decrease in pressure took place in the face of record high oil prices, increased world competition to secure future oil supplies and the emergence of the new Asian partners of the Angolan government (China, India and possibly South Korea).³⁸

The government is attempting to show signs of progress in its anti-corruption and transparency efforts. It has authorised the publication of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank reports on public websites and has published excerpts of the reports in government-controlled media. It has shown some movement toward ratification of the UN and African Union anti-corruption conventions and towards joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The IMF and the World Bank have noted positive steps by the Angolan government in eliminating off-budget expenditures and the international community recently witnessed and praised an oil concession round for its unprecedented openness and transparency.³⁹

Nevertheless, in practice, transparency problems in the management of public accounts remain and were recently noted by Elias Isaac, the Angolan representative of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (Osisa), during a meeting on transparency in Luanda. Specifically referring to the recently revised national budget for 2006 and the way public revenues are being (un)accounted for, he said:

We have to understand this enormous gap between the first approved budget of US\$23-billion and this upward revision for circa US\$40-billion. Where are the revenues to cover this gap coming from? How do they enter into the country? How will these expenses be processed?⁴⁰

During the parliamentary discussion on the budget revision, Unita's parliamentary leader, Alcides Sakala, stressed the same:

There is still a serious deficit in good governance and transparency on recent financial operations. To the present day, the government has systematically refused to explain how the record high oil prices have increased its revenues and how these revenues are being managed.⁴¹

Political opposition parties: political and institutional fragility

Opposition parties are politically and institutionally fragile and operate in an adversarial environment. Although there are 125 registered political parties in Angola, less than a quarter are operational. The MPLA holds a majority with 129 seats out of 220 in the national assembly, while Unita holds 70 seats and other parties the remainder of the seats. Opposition parties represented in the parliament live essentially on funds from the state budget. They all complain that this is not sufficient⁴² and that the funds are paid irregularly (sometimes even suspended) to disrupt their activities. In face of such financial restrictions it is extremely difficult for the opposition parties to expand their activities outside of the provincial capital cities.

The Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) has included members of several opposition parties since 1997, but several of their leaders accuse the majority party of pre-empting the competencies of every governmental position occupied by their representatives. The opposition feels compelled to stay in the government due to their fear of retaliation in terms of cancellation of state budget funds for opposition parties and in relation to other benefits.⁴³

There are still reports of authoritarianism and political intolerance against the opposition (especially in the provinces) such as beatings, threats and arson of their properties in rural areas (e.g. Luwemba in July 2004⁴⁴, Mavinga in March 2005⁴⁵ and Chongoroi in April 2006⁴⁶). The MPLA still retains an active paramilitary militia in the neighbourhoods (Organisation of Civil Defence) funded by the state budget. Still under investigation is the murder of the opposition leader of the PDP-ANA (*Partido Democrático para o Progresso/Aliança Nacional de Angola* – Democratic Party for Progress/National Alliance of Angola), M'Fulupinga Landu Victor, in Luanda, on 2 July 2004, which spread fear among opposition and civil society organisations (CSOs).⁴⁷

Several opposition leaders and CSOs have expressed their disappointment with the international community, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the EU, for dropping the pressure that was being exerted on the government in relation to transparency and human rights issues (*c.f. supra*).⁴⁸ They also fear that government signs of progress on anti-corruption and transparency efforts are nothing but pre-electoral cosmetics.⁴⁹

As was the case during the one-party regime, the state is still operating as a mechanism for patronage by funding and supporting its political clientèles. According to opposition leaders and supporters, social, professional and economic progress is greatly affected by an individual's decision to join or not to join the party in power.⁵⁰

Given the above context it is not hard to understand why the national assembly remains a rubber stamp for laws approved by the Council of Ministers presided over by the president.⁵¹ The opposition in general has its scarce energies and resources absorbed by its own internal problems or in legal-bureaucratic disputes with the MPLA (which it loses because of a lack of numbers and votes in parliament). Opposition parties consequently have a serious inability to mobilise the electorate. In several of the less representative parties there is also a micro replication of the same patrimonial logic that dominates the regime (i.e. favouritism, clientelism, confusion between party and personal assets).⁵²

Civil society organisations: internal constraints and external dependency

With the Angolan transition to a multi-party system in the early nineties, a significant amount of international aid and development cooperation funds arrived in tandem with international governmental organisations (IGOs), international NGOs, churches and charitable institutions. Transnational projects gathered expatriate activists, local communities and some Angolan mid and high level personnel eager to work outside the regime's constraints. An operative articulation between foreign and national activists fuelled the emerging civil society.

Given the need for reinvestment in armament, the government increased its reliance on international aid. Throughout the nineties, national and international NGOs, together with church organisations became the main providers of humanitarian assistance and several social services such as basic healthcare, nutrition, sanitation and support to internally displaced persons. This role gave them increasing legitimacy to speak out and testify in relation to serious human rights abuses and violations throughout the country.⁵³

On occasion these activities made them politically inconvenient to the regime, which reacted strategically in the second half of the nineties by investing in parallel civil society. This strategy continues until today and examples of these organisations include AJAPRZ (Angolan youth returned from Zambia), Children's Future (*Criança Futuro*) and Friends of Rangel.

Also denouncing government investment in civil society, Fernando Pacheco, who presides over the biggest Angolan NGO – Adra (*Ação Angolana para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente/Action for Rural and Environmental Development*), stresses that:

The political power in general and the State in particular understand the need to invest in the civil society arena and therefore created some CSOs. The MPLA's Office to Support Citizenship and Civil Society (*Gabinete de Apoio à Cidadania e Sociedade Civil*) is also a recent and important sign in this sense.⁵⁴

Government friendly CSOs basically serve the government and presidential need for a cooperative 'civil society' that can be politically manipulated (e.g. participating in the approval of laws without contesting them and therefore satisfying the international demand for taking into account 'civil society opinion').⁵⁵ In return these organisations have easier access to state

structures, official State permits and to the public and private sectors of the economy, while most of the others face several obstacles. In this regard a human rights activist says:

The activity of civil society has not been easy [since its emergence], especially for those institutions and persons that do not accept manipulation or co-optation by the government or the governing party, the MPLA, and they can be easily distinguished from others who call themselves civic organisations, but in fact maintain an obscure (proximate) relationship with the government.⁵⁶

While the government intensified support for its own CSOs, most of the other CSOs experienced increased difficulties in the late nineties and early 2000s, not only because of the constraints created by the regime, but also because of the strong dependence they developed on foreign expertise, technical support and funding, and because several of the most competent Angolan cadres were recruited by international NGOs and IGOs.⁵⁷ The following factors further contribute significantly to the weaknesses that currently characterise Angolan CSOs and hamper their development:

- a) a deficit in long-term sustained networking capacity, at national, regional and international levels⁵⁸;
- b) a deficit in their capacity to develop and sustain their own perspectives. Their agendas are primarily determined by donors and foreign partners, rather than by the needs of the communities they work with.

Again, according to Fernando Pacheco from Adra:

Within a society that has been so deteriorated by war, authoritarian rule – including the colonial past – and foreign pressures (political, economic and of all kinds), without an entrepreneurial class with a significant impact on economy and politics, it would be extremely difficult to imagine a strong civil society ... However, there are also external factors contributing to our civil society fragility such as ... a few segments of the international dimension – governments, donor agencies and NGOs – imposing their agendas (environment, gender, HIV, transparency, good governance, human rights, democracy, corruption) without taking into consideration our own agendas and above all our own rhythms, which in some cases leads to the blockage of local initiatives ...⁵⁹

The weaknesses and fragilities of Angolan CSOs became even more visible when external funding started reducing from 2000 onwards. The donor community became increasingly disgusted by the true role played by several international organisations in terms of taking over the social responsibilities of the Angolan State⁶⁰, this while several international reports revealed schemes for the mismanagement of oil revenues and endemic corruption within the Angolan political system.⁶¹ Consequently, humanitarian aid substantially decreased and was even halted in several regions (mainly in the centre-north), which were no longer considered to be in need of such support. This indirectly affected several development projects implemented by national and international NGOs in parallel to humanitarian aid, e.g. in the case of Adra-Malange, the biggest and most reputable Angolan NGO, with a myriad of participatory development

projects with community-based organisations in this province. Oikos-Malange, a long time established Portuguese NGO in the Malange province, also working with a few community-based participatory development projects in that area, was affected in a similar way.⁶²

Despite the above mentioned constraints, weaknesses and fragilities, it must be added that some Angolan CSOs have been playing leading roles in significant initiatives in the defence of civil, political and economic rights, and are much more active in this area than the gross majority of political parties in parliament (e.g. in relation to the land law, the HIV and AIDS law, the struggle for the rights of forcibly evicted communities, and better conditions for prisoners).⁶³

Discussed below are a few of the most prominent advocacy justice organisations that have been dealing with politically sensitive issues and which face serious obstacles to their work: the *Association of Justice, Peace and Democracy (AJPD)*, *Mãos Livres* (Free Hands), *SOS-Habitat* and *Mpalabanda*.⁶⁴

AJPD is the initiative of a few young Catholics concerned with constitutional reform, HIV and AIDS legislation and the improvement of the penal system. So far, their main achievement is to call domestic and international attention to prison conditions, which constitutes a serious threat to the health and lives of prisoners. Usually suspicious of local associations receiving international support, the government blocked the registration of the *AJPD* and the Ministry of Justice continues to block its registration by not taking action on its application originally filed in 2000. The association appealed to the Supreme Court, but without much success so far, and continues to experience extreme difficulty in its relationships with State institutions. According to one of its representatives:

The Ministry of Justice and the Procurator General of the Republic publicly tried to defame our association, taking us for a disguised political party. We also had – and still have, although decreasing – difficulties of access to the State institutions.⁶⁵

Mãos Livres was founded by a group of journalists and lawyers and offers legal assistance free of charge. The association is now expanding to the provinces, where it is most needed, but where it is also facing severe obstacles. There is an enormous shortage of lawyers in the whole country, but especially in the provinces (e.g. there is only one lawyer in the whole province of Malange). The provincial administrations and ‘mighty’ provincial governors are also well known for their authoritarian and arbitrary rule⁶⁶. The association also enjoys a prominent role in cases of forced evictions of communities in Luanda by the government (as a part of an urban renewal project)⁶⁷, and has taken a few demolition cases to court.

These demolitions and forced evictions are carried out by the police force using violence and without any compensation to those losing their property. This is still continuing and a new organisation has emerged to stand up for the rights of those evicted – *SOS-Habitat*. Its strategy is based on participatory community methods, dissemination of knowledge of legal mechanisms to protect the rights of the urban poor and by helping them to resist illegal evictions. Direct confrontation with provincial and local authorities on a regular basis has been an obstacle for some donors in terms of funding them (because several of these are unwilling to displease the government due to their business interests

in the oil industry).⁶⁸ SOS-Habitat's coordinator, Lu's Araújo, has been arrested a number of times. During a recent public demonstration (camping with several activists in a community of evicted persons) he pointed out that the poor people affected were treated as if they were the garbage of Angola and that several so-called human rights activists were not willing to take any concrete solidarity actions in the field, restricting their contributions to theoretical approaches in conferences inside and outside the country.⁶⁹

After the memorandum of Luena, the conflict in Cabinda remains unsolved. The role of the Catholic Church, followed by Osisa and the Cabinda Civic Association – *Mpalabanda*, was extremely important in 2002/3 in denouncing and curbing serious human rights abuses in Cabinda. These were taking place in the course of major counter-insurgency operations of the Angolan armed forces against FLEC. *Mpalabanda* was officially created and registered in 2003 in terms of the Law of Associations of May 1991 and after two consecutive refusals by the provincial government to allow a meeting to take place. The organisation was finally allowed to hold its first meeting in March 2004. Its monitoring reports became increasingly uncomfortable for the government⁷⁰ and since its creation it has been refused permission on several occasions to hold meetings and marches to commemorate Cabinda Day.⁷¹

Having abandoned the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (FCD) before the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding with the government (*c.f. supra*), *Mpalabanda*, headed by Agostinho Chicaia, faced threats from government to ban *Mpalabanda*, a threat which it duly carried out on 20 July 2006. In a case instituted by the Angolan government against *Mpalabanda*, the Provincial Court of Cabinda ruled that *Mpalabanda* should be banned under the allegation that it had incited violence and hatred and carried out political activities, rather than operating as a civil society organisation. More recently, on 29 September 2006, the organisation's Press Officer, Raul Danda, was arrested following allegations of crimes against state security, namely that he incited violence through his writings, which were critical of the Memorandum of Understanding.⁷² *Mpalabanda* is the only human rights organisation operating in the province of Cabinda and according to Amnesty International "its closure will leave Cabinda, an area rife with egregious violations of human rights, without a human rights organisation to monitor and record violations of human rights."⁷³

Prospects for change in view of forthcoming elections: possible guidelines for future action

Several opposition parties and CSOs think that the dynamics generated by the forthcoming electoral process holds potential for at least some socio-political change. This expectation is based on the experience of the periods of peace and relative openness of 1991-1992 and 1994-1998. During these periods, the MPLA had made significant political concessions to the opposition and to a newborn civil society. The regime opened much more political space than it probably intended, and even if this space contracted every time war resumed, it was not possible to diminish it to its original form. Based on these experiences, hopes are focused again on the next electoral process as a new major step for openness and democratisation of the regime.⁷⁴

Although these expectations are reasonable, the experience and lessons learned from the two previous periods of more openness and peace must also take into account that the overall context has changed. In these periods Unita had significant internal leverage with an efficient army controlling parts of the national territory and enjoying some significant foreign support.

From 2002 onwards the whole context has changed in favour of the MPLA:

- It has reinforced state control and governance under the new multi-party framework;
- It has militarily defeated Unita, who lost its international backing, and is now weak and dependant just like the rest of the opposition;
- It has reinforced its grip over CSOs – tightening its control over the state media and imposing effective restrictions on the private media;
- It has strong political control over the ‘new market economy’;
- It has a good political and economic relationship with the US and the Western countries who are eager to please it; and
- It is well advanced in preparing and managing the forthcoming electoral process.

Many opposition leaders and civil society activists appear to be aware of this new context. To overcome the increasing hegemony of the party and state, they stress the vital need for major and strategic articulation between internal and international CSOs in terms of leverage. There is general disappointment in Angola with international governmental organisations, the donor community and Western democracies for dropping their pressure on the Angolan government for transparency, accountability and human rights – in face of their new international and economic interests in Angola (*c.f. supra*). Some Angolan CSOs perceive international CSOs as having significant global lobbying, networking and advocacy capacity for the mobilisation of international public opinion in order to pressure IGOs, the donor community and their governments into adopting a much firmer stance on democratic values in the Angolan political process. Other Angolan CSOs are much more sceptical about the prospects of external leverage and stress that Angolan (and African) CSOs and political opposition must rely much more on their own populations and internal discontent as the main impetus for socio-political change.⁷⁵

These two positions, however, are in fact complementary and leads to some possible guidelines for future action for national and foreign actors committed to change:

- On the one hand it must be recognised that because the supply of oil is diminishing worldwide, certain regimes, including Angola, are currently able to extract strong concessions from the outside world. This includes the disconcerting realisation that some governments and organisations are more strongly influenced by economic interests than humanitarian concern.⁷⁶ In this context, it is strongly recommended that all international CSOs supporting the struggle for human rights and democratisation in Angola step forward and assume a much more active role. This should continue to include support for their Angolan counterparts, but must importantly also include advocacy and lobbying in their own countries and regions to create pressure on Western governments and IGOs in support of an agenda for democratisation and human rights in Angola.

- Angolan CSOs have to pay more attention internally, searching out and connecting with their constituencies. CSOs in general prioritise the agendas and perspectives of their donors and foreign partners, rather than their own perspectives and the aims of the communities they serve. Angolan CSOs must also engage in much more strategic cooperation and networking with each other, so that they can use their limited resources for broader social impact.
- The short-term and project-driven involvement of donors and preferential relationships with a few selected national partners, have fragmented rather than united Angolan CSOs. Donors and international organisations must acknowledge this fact in general and assume a different posture.
- Angolan political parties are distant from the electorate and are having serious difficulties in relating to the people and representing their needs. They hope that the international community will support their claims, but they also need to make serious efforts to connect with communities and to build their constituencies.

According to a well-known Angolan human rights activist:

Our CSOs have not been able to establish an effective platform to articulate positions in matters of principle, as a minimum common denominator for action, e.g. denouncement of basic violations of human rights disrespecting the Angolan law and international treaties ratified by the Angolan government. We should all meet to start a discussion on a few basic principles for common action. That never happened for several reasons: there are obstacles deriving from the fact that several CSOs maintain more or less close relationships with power interests (political, religious, etc.); there are some rivalries and competition among national CSOs for leadership of network projects and processes and/or foreign funds; there is still a deficit of the culture of social solidarity, which was deeply affected after 1977 (i.e. with the repression that followed the attempted coup, fomenting the fear of involvement in public activities outside of mass party organisations; people were taught to mind their own business).

Besides internal articulation and more effective cooperation between CSOs, there is also the need for networking and lobbying of foreign governments and institutions to pressure the Angolan government to respect human rights. Our civil society needs these combined efforts inside and outside the country, but according to our own agendas and the needs of the communities we work with. There is an urgent need for a deeper participation of the people in these processes, but there is still too much fear and as I said there is not a culture of broad social solidarity of a citizen type. A major propeller for massive political participation of the people would be local elections, but that is planned to occur only after legislative and presidential elections, and no one knows when they will occur.⁷⁷

Whether the forthcoming electoral process will provide potential for change will therefore greatly depend on the commitment to change by national and international players and particularly on effective articulation and interaction between them. This is obviously easier to say than to do; it is a long-term endeavour and there are no magic recipes for constructing strong civil societies overnight with the capacity of sustaining specific electoral processes and strong democracies.

From the analysis provided – discussion, communication, information, participation and networking (national, regional and international) – must be at the centre of this process. But there are serious political and economic obstacles at the national and international level, which will require significant effort to overcome. As emphasised by Lu's de Araújo, a first step in Angola could be a small and focused programme for articulated action – a minimum common denominator between CSOs. Strategies, goals and agendas for action must come from within. Foreign organisations can contribute significantly to this endeavour by providing facilitating mechanisms and coordinated international lobbying.

Insofar as some of the problems hampering the democratisation process in Angola are not exclusive to Angola, and can be found in other countries of the region, the idea of a Southern African Regional Platform/Observatory for Human Rights and Democratisation could also be an effective way of developing and planning the articulation needed for national and international leverage for change.⁷⁸

Emphasis should be given to strategic networking and coordination at national, regional and international levels, facilitating the relationship between the media, CSOs, political parties, governments (Southern African and foreign) and international governmental organisations. Partnerships should include CSOs from the SADC region and beyond, and include international organisations such as the UN and the EU. These institutions would be responsible for monitoring and evaluation, data collection, data sharing, mutual support (denouncing violations of political and civil rights and the lack of democratic procedure and engaging with regional governments over these issues). They should also support and facilitate capacity building of their Angolan partner organisations and facilitate the broad participation of community-based organisations – especially in rural areas.

Notes

- ¹ Organisations such as the Labour Union of Angolan Workers (UNIA), Organisation of Angolan Women (OMA – *Organização da Mulher Angolana*) and the MPLA's youth wing (JMPLA – *Juventude do MPLA*); see Vidal, N., 2004, 'The genesis and development of the Angolan political and administrative system from 1975 to the present', in 'Intersections between social sciences', ed. S. Kyle, Institute for African Development of Cornell University, Cornell NY, pp. 1-16.
- ² Ibid.
- ³ Human Rights Watch 1999, *Angola unravels: the rise and fall of the Lusaka peace process*, HRW, New York.

- ⁴ Human Rights Watch 1994, *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections*, HRW, New York.
- ⁵ Vidal, N., 2003, 'Modern and Post-Modern Patrimonialism' in *Community & the State in Lusophone Africa*, ed. M. Newitt with P. Chabal & N. MacQueen, King's College London, London, pp.1-14.
- ⁶ Constitutional revisions changing the constitution to a new political and economic framework: Law 12/91, DR, I, 19 (May 6, 1991) and also Law 23/92, DR, I, 38 (September 16, 1992).
- ⁷ Namely the laws of association (Law 14/91), freedom of the press (Law 25/91), labour and strikes (Law 23/91) and independent radio broadcasting (Law 16/92).
- ⁸ Without exception, all the new private radio stations were indirectly controlled by the MPLA; broadcasting licenses were conceded to MPLA members that were supposed to assume a pro-governmental stance in the face of forthcoming elections: LAC – *Luanda Antena Comercial* (Luanda); *Rádio 2000* (Lubango); *Rádio Morena* (Benguela) and *Rádio Comercial* (Cabinda). Unita's *Rádio Voz do Galo Negro* (Voice of the Black Rooster), unauthorised during the civil war was then authorised but again declared illegal as soon as the war resumed in October 1992.
- ⁹ Currently there are over 120 registered NGOs operating in the country, of which approximately 45 are Angolan.
- ¹⁰ E.g., Folha 8, Actual Fax, Agora, Comércio & Actualidade, O Independente and Angolense, joining Imparcial Fax, which has existed since 1991; see, Vidal, N. 2005, "Country profile Angola", in *An Assessment of Human Rights Defender Initiatives in Southern Africa*, eds. Motala, A., Vidal, N., Pigou, P. & Govender, V., Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa – Niza, Amsterdam, pp.47-62.
- ¹¹ See, Vidal, N. 2006, "Multipartidarismo em Angola", in *O processo de transição para o multipartidarismo em Angola*, ed. N. Vidal & J. Pinto de Andrade, Firmamento, Luanda & Lisbon, pp.11-57.
- ¹² For more information about this foundation and the regime's investment in civil society see Messiant, C. 1999, 'La Fondation Eduardo dos Santos (FESA): autour de l'investissement de la société civile par le pouvoir angolais', in *Politique Africaine*, 73, pp.82-101.
- ¹³ See Amnesty International 1999, *Angola, freedom of expression under threat*, Index AFR 12/016/1999, November 1 [Online] also Amnesty International 2000, *Angola: unfair trial of Rafael Marques*, AI: March 31 [Online]. Both available at: <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR120161999>.
- ¹⁴ From private interviews with the author by all the opposition leaders dealing with internal factions.
- ¹⁵ In the late 90s, a myriad projects and initiatives for peace emerged between Churches and CSOs: the Pro Pace movement; the Angolan Group Reflecting on Peace (GARP); the Programme for Peace Building (PCP); and a number of others. For a detailed analysis of these initiatives, see Comerford, M. 2005, *O Rosto Pacífico de Angola*, Author's edition, Luanda, especially the end of chapter 2 and chapter 4.
- ¹⁶ The recruitment campaign has been particularly active in the capital city,

central highlands and South-East – Huambo, Bié, Moxico, Cuando-Cubango – traditionally seen as Unita's stronghold. Party membership is currently around 2-million compared to 998,199 in 1998.

- ¹⁷ See *Jornal de Angola*, 2005, December 10, pp.8-9; also the book published by the Ministry of Territorial Administration on the First National Conference on Angolan Traditional Authorities and supported by the President: *Ministério da Administração do Território – MAT (2004), 1º Encontro Nacional Sobre a Autoridade Tradicional em Angola*, MAT, Luanda.
- ¹⁸ Chinese loans are estimated at US\$4 billion and were made available at lower interest rates and over a longer term than the loans made available by international financial institutions. One must also take into account that Angolan oil revenues for 2005 were around \$6.88 billion with prices at record highs. The official characterisation of these loans by the Ministry of Finance is available at [www.minfin.gv.ao/]. See also Miranda, A. 2004, *Angola 2003/2004, Waiting for Elections*, Michelsen Institute, Norway, p.18; also Global Witness Press Release 2005, September 23, Western banks to give huge new loan to Angola in further blow to transparency.
- ¹⁹ See Eduardo dos Santos' statements at the Central Committee meeting on 27 January 2006; in *Jornal de Angola*, 2006, January 28; also reported by the BBC, 2006, January 28. In some cases this strategy might be counter-productive, i.e. several urbanisation plans have resulted in forced and violent evictions of thousands of families, spreading discontent among a significant part of the urban population. The author was able to visit some of the evicted communities (Kilamba Kiaxi and Viana Km25) and interviewed its members in November 2005 and May 2006. The living conditions of these people are inhuman (c.f. *infra*).
- ²⁰ Statements of Alves da Rocha, an economist involved with several international projects working with the Ministry of Planning and Professor at the Angolan Catholic University, produced in Luanda on August 23, 2006, during a seminar on "The Angolan private sector and the challenges of globalization"; see *Jornal de Angola*, August 24, 2006.
- ²¹ For now the opposition seems to have managed to postpone the approval of a new constitution in the new legislature, but that might not be a victory if the MPLA achieves its aims of obtaining $\frac{2}{3}$ of the seats in the new parliament.
- ²² The majority party and the president have directly or indirectly appointed 8 out of 11 members of the National Electoral Council, also assuring a majority in the provincial, municipal and communal electoral commissions; Compare electoral law approved by the National Assembly, Law 6/05, DR, I, 95 (August 10, 2005), with Council of Ministers Decree 63/05, DR, I, 111 (September 16, 2005) and Council of Ministers Decree 62/05, DR, I, 107 (September 7, 2005). See also the statements produced by Unita's Secretary for Information, Adalberto da Costa Júnior, in a press conference in Luanda on December 7, 2005, under the title *Alert on the legitimacy and dangers of the electoral process*.
- ²³ See forthcoming, Vidal, N., 'The Angolan Regime and the Move to Multiparty Politics', in Chabal, P. & Vidal, N. (eds), *Angola: the weight of history*, Hurst & Co. & Indiana University Press, London & Bloomington Indiana.

- ²⁴ A new press law was approved in February 2006, abolishing the State monopoly over television broadcasting, but based on the example of commercial radio stations in 1992, one should not expect politically independent television channels.
- ²⁵ Human Rights Watch Report 2004, *Unfinished democracy: media and political freedoms in Angola*, HRW, Washington.
- ²⁶ João Paulo N'Ganga, former chief editor of the newspaper *Folha 8*, N'Ganga, J. P. 2006, "Meios de comunicação social e a democracia em Angola", in ed. Vidal, N. & Pinto de Andrade, J., *O processo de transição para o multipartidarismo em Angola*, Firmamento, Luanda & Lisbon, pp. 218-219, p.221.
- ²⁷ See alerts issued by Misa (Media Institute of Southern Africa), February 23, 2005, "Director of Government News Agency threatens to shoot journalist".
- ²⁸ The minister alleged that Rádio Ecclesia had illegally recorded the statements of a regional police commander of Cazenga, superintendent Domingos Fernandes, on the release of 3.000 detainees and its possible negative impact on criminality. The commander spoke during a municipal administration meeting to which Rádio Ecclesia and several other media were invited and allowed to cover. The minister proffered such absurd threats during an interview to the National Radio on July 22, 2006. On this issue see *Angonot'cias*, July 24, 2006, "Hipótese de indiciar Ecclesia de espionagem contra a segurança do Estado", available online at: [www.angonoticias.com]
- ²⁹ Statements of Cornélio Bento to the Voice of America; see Voice of America – Vision Angola, August 16, 2006; available at [http://www.voanews.com/portuguese/]
- ³⁰ Cit. in *Reporters san Frontières*, July 18, 2006, Tuesday. The two journalists are Benício Wedeinge, the Director of Televisao Publica de Angola in the southern province of Cunene – killed on 16 July 2006 – and Augusto Pedro, the correspondent of *Jornal de Angola* in the western province of Bengo – killed on 8 July 2006.
- ³¹ One of the most recent and clarifying examples is the Supreme Court decision of July 22, 2005, which ruled that President Dos Santos' period in office from 1992 did not constitute a presidential term, in order to circumvent the constitutional provision that limits presidential terms to three five-year terms. If this period was considered to be a presidential term, his overall period of administration – since the first presidential elections in 1992 – would count as three five-year presidential terms (1992-2007) and would prevent him from running for office again.
- ³² See Marques, L. P. M., 2004, *Labirinto do sistema judicial angolano*, notas para a sua compreensão, Author's edition, Luanda, especially part II.
- ³³ Eurico, Jorge, 2006, "A sociedade civil e a democracia participativa em Angola", in *O processo de transição para o multipartidarismo em Angola*, eds. Vidal, N. & Pinto de Andrade, J., Firmamento, Luanda & Lisbon, pp. 226-227; Jorge Eurico is a member of the Association of Justice, Peace and Democracy (AJPD) and also a journalist; c.f. *infra*.
- ³⁴ On this subject see forthcoming Hodges, Tony, 2007, "The Economic Foundations of the Patrimonial State", in Chabal, P. & Vidal, N. (eds), *Angola:*

the weight of history, Hurst & Co. & Indiana University Press, London & Bloomington Indiana.

- ³⁵ See Vieira Lopes, F. 2006, "Gestão do poder e desenvolvimento em Angola", in eds. Vidal, N. & Pinto de Andrade, J., *O processo de transição ...op. cit.*, pp.169-174; Ferreira, M. E., 1995, 'La reconversion économique de la nomenclature pétrolière', in *Politique Africaine*, 57, pp.11-26; Aguilar, R. 2003, "Angola's private sector : rents, distribution and oligarchy", in *African Development Perspectives*, eds. Wohlmuth, K., Gutowski, A., Knedlick, T., Meyn, M. & Pitamber, S., Lit Verlag, Germany; Aguilar, R. 2005, *Angola: getting off the hook*, SIDA & Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, especially pp. 13-18.
- ³⁶ On this issue see "Angolan cease fire agreement signed, but questions remain" in *Global Insight*, July 19, 2006.
- ³⁷ See the statement of Dan Mozena (Director, Office of Southern African Affairs) before the House International Relations Sub-committee on Africa, Global Human Rights & International Operations, July 20, 2006, in US State department press release, July 21, 2006, *Angola's long delayed elections*.
- ³⁸ See Independent Task Force Report to the Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, *More than humanitarianism: a strategic US approach towards Africa*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, especially pp. 32-33, 49-50; also Aguilar, R., 2005, *Angola: getting off ... op. cit.*, especially pp. 2, 13-18.
- ³⁹ See the statement of Dan Mozena (Director, Office of Southern African Affairs) before the House International Relations Sub-committee on Africa, Global Human Rights & International Operations, July 20, 2006, in a US State department press release, July 21, 2006, *Angola's long delayed elections*.
- ⁴⁰ Statements of Elias Isaac to Voice of America – Vision Angola, August 17, 2006; available at [<http://www.voanews.com/portuguese/>]
- ⁴¹ Statements of Alcides Sakala to Voice of America – Vision Angola, August 15, 2006; available at [<http://www.voanews.com/portuguese/>]
- ⁴² Political parties represented in the parliament receive US\$10 per vote obtained in the 1992 election, which totals at around US\$14-million for Unita per year, and sums that vary between US\$100,000 and US\$900,000 for the rest of the opposition parties – the majority situated within the US\$100,000 and US\$200,000 range. The MPLA receives circa \$21.5-million. For the exact number of votes obtained by each party in the 1992 elections see, Marques, Sofia 1993, *Angola: da Guerra à Democracia*, Edipress, Luanda, p. 43.
- ⁴³ Without much success, Unita's leader, Isaias Samakuva, has been trying to replace some of his government and parliamentary representatives occupying such positions since the days of Unita-Renovada (Renewed Unita; MPLA sponsored; c.f. supra).
- ⁴⁴ A Unita property was burned and members threatened. The author was able to visit the place and talk to Unita's representatives in Luwemba in the Huambo province in September 2004.
- ⁴⁵ Unita's members in Mavinga in the Cuando Cubango province were beaten and threatened.
- ⁴⁶ Unita's representative in Chongoroi in the Benguela province was murdered.

- ⁴⁷ M'Fulupinga presided over the party and was a Professor of mathematics (Faculty of Economics – Agostinho Neto University). Although he was born in Angola during the colonial period, he grew up in former Zaire and then returned to Angola like so many people in the North of the country, usually referred to as *Bakongo retornados* (returnees from the Bakongo). It must also be noted that members of M'Fulupinga's party are particularly persecuted in the North and East of the country and discriminated against outside their provinces of origin (U'ge and Zaire). They often complain about abuses committed by the police such as beatings, extortion, illegal arrests, confiscation of documents, being denied access to the formal labour market, etc. Complaints were presented to the author and sustained by several legal documents in Malange in September 2004.
- ⁴⁸ See Independent Task Force Report to the Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, *More than humanitarianism: a strategic US approach toward Africa*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, especially pp. 32-33, 49-50; also Aguilar, R., 2005, *Angola: getting off ...op. cit.*, especially pp. 2, 13-18.
- ⁴⁹ The author was able to participate in the "Angola Petroleum Revenue Management Workshop" that took place in Luanda at the Ministry of Finance (May, 18-19, 2006), attended by government representatives, oil companies, foreign consultants and civil society members. The author was therefore in a position to observe the careful selection of civil society representatives in a complex process conducted by the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance. The concluding statement presented by the World Bank representative was very cautious and diplomatic and included some comments made by civil society representatives, but it was immediately and publicly rejected by the Deputy Minister of Finance who disagreed with the contents and demanded changes to the text before publication. A meeting of civil society representatives a few days later (also attended by the author) was unanimous in considering their presence at the meeting as mainly cosmetic and serving the government's internal and external purpose of claiming that civil society representatives had been present and had been heard.
- ⁵⁰ The level of entrenchment of political patronage within the party-state structures can be clearly perceived in an interview with the Angolan Ambassador to Brazil, Alberto Correia Neto, in which he assumes that part of the Angolan State funds are managed outside of the financial system and in which he accepts that bribery (co-optation) of political opponents is natural and normal practice; In *O Globo* November 21, 2005. See also the accusations of Cláudio Silva, member of the National Electoral Commission (proposed by Unita), to the Voice Of America and BBC on the 12th October 2005; also McMillan, J., 2005, *The main institution in the country is corruption: creating transparency in Angola*, Center on democracy, development and the rule of law – Stanford Institute of International Studies, Stanford.
- ⁵¹ Human Rights Watch Report January 2004, *Some transparency, no accountability, the use of oil revenue in Angola and its impact on Human rights*, vol. 16, no. 1, especially pp. 76-77; also, Miranda, A., *Angola 2003/2004, ...op.cit...*, especially pp.25-26.
- ⁵² See forthcoming, Chabal, P. & Vidal, N. (eds), 2007, *Angola: the weight of*

history, Hurst & Co. & Indiana University Press, London & Bloomington Indiana.

- ⁵³ See forthcoming, Vidal, N. 2007, "Social neglect and the Emergence of Civil Society" in Chabal, P. & Vidal, N. (eds), *op. cit.*
- ⁵⁴ Pacheco, F. 2006, "Sociedade civil e a construção da democracia em Angola" in *O processo de transição para o multipartidarismo em Angola*, eds. Vidal, N. & Pinto de Andrade, J., Firmamento, Luanda & Lisbon, p.215.
- ⁵⁵ Messiant, C., 2006, "Transição para o multipartidarismo sem transição para a democracia", in *O processo de transição para o multipartidarismo em Angola*, eds. Vidal, N. & Pinto de Andrade, J., Firmamento, Luanda & Lisbon, pp. 131-161; also forthcoming, Messiant, C., 2007, 'The Mutation of Hegemonic Domination', in Chabal, P. & Vidal, N. (eds), *Angola: the weight of history*, Hurst & Co. & Indiana University Press, London & Bloomington Indiana.
- ⁵⁶ In Eurico, Jorge, 2006, "A sociedade civil e a democracia participativa em Angola", in *O processo de transição para o multipartidarismo em Angola*, eds. Vidal, N. & Pinto de Andrade, J., Firmamento, Luanda & Lisbon, p. 224.
- ⁵⁷ There are very few exceptions to this general rule; see Vidal, N. 2005, "Country profile Angola", ...*op. cit.*, pp. 47-62.
- ⁵⁸ Short-term and project-driven involvement of donors and preferential relationships with certain partners fragmented rather than unified Angolan CSOs.
- ⁵⁹ Pacheco, F. 2006, "Sociedade civil e a construção da democracia em Angola" in *O processo de transição para o multipartidarismo em Angola*, eds. Vidal, N. & Pinto de Andrade, J., Firmamento, Luanda & Lisbon, p.214.
- ⁶⁰ Médecins Sans Frontières Report November 9, 2000, Angola: as aparências de 'normalização' escondem graves cenas de guerra, MSF, Luanda; also Diário de Notícias (November 12, 2000) and Público (April 27, 2000).
- ⁶¹ Global Witness Report, December 1999, 'A Crude Awakening: the role of the oil and banking industries in Angola's civil war and the plunder of the state assets', GW, London; also Global Witness Report March 2002, *All the Presidents' men*, GW, London; also Global Witness Report December 1998, *A Rough Trade: the role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict*, GW, London. Editions online at [www.globalwitness.org/cgi-bin/search.cgi?m=phrase&np=2&ps=10&q=angola].
- ⁶² From private interviews with provincial representatives of these two organisations in 2005 and 2006. On this subject see also forthcoming, Vidal, N. 2007, "Social neglect ... *op. cit.*
- ⁶³ See, Vidal, N. 2005, "Country profile Angola" ...*op. cit.* pp.47-62; Jilani, H., February 21, 2005, Promotion and protection of Human Rights, Human Rights Defenders, a report submitted by the special representative of the UN Secretary General on the situation of Human Rights Defenders, Mission to Angola; United Nations, New York; Comerford, M., 2005, *O Rosto Pacífico* ...*op. cit.*, especially chp.4; forthcoming, Vidal, N. 2007, "Social neglect ...*op. cit.*
- ⁶⁴ Both *Mãos Livres* and *AJPD* were created in 2002, strongly backed by foreign partners – *AJPD* supported by the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (Osisa) and *Mãos Livres* by the UN Human Rights Department. *SOS-Habitat* was created in 2002, as a genuine grassroots organisation in the outskirts of

Luanda. Mpalabanda was created in 2003 to oppose human rights violations in Cabinda.

- ⁶⁵ In Eurico, Jorge, 2006, "A sociedade civil e a democracia participativa em Angola", in *O processo de transição para o multipartidarismo em Angola*, eds. Vidal, N. & Pinto de Andrade, J., Firmamento, Luanda & Lisbon, p.227; see also, AJPD's most recent report, Associação Justiça Paz e Democracia, November 2005, *Relatório de Direitos Humanos, um olhar sobre o sistema penal angolano, Agosto de 2000-Outubro de 2004*, AJPD, Luanda.
- ⁶⁶ US Department of State, 31 March 2003, Angola. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, State Department, Washington DC.
- ⁶⁷ Amnesty International 2003, *Mass Forced Evictions in Luanda – A Call for a Human Rights-Based Housing Policy*, AI, London.
- ⁶⁸ Some of the most recent events occurred in the community of Mulevos in June 2006; the author was able to visit some of the evicted communities (in Kilamba Kiaxi – Cambamba 1 and 2, and Viana – Km25) and interview its members in November 2005 and May 2006. Living conditions of these people are inhuman, without water and sleeping under plastic and all kinds of debris recovered from their demolished homes (c.f. *Supra*). See also Amnesty International January 25th 2006, *Angola: Forced eviction, use of excessive force*, AI reference: AFR 12/001/2006; also Amnesty International December 2, 2005, AFR 12/005/2005. Editions available online at [<http://web.amnesty.org>].
- ⁶⁹ See statements of Lu's Araújo in *Angonoticias*, August 18, 2006; available online at [www.angonoticias.com].
- ⁷⁰ See Mpalabanda reports on the human rights situation in Cabinda: 1st report, Mpalabanda Associação Cívica de Cabinda, 2002, *Terror em Cabinda*, Mpalabanda, Luanda; 2nd report, Mpalabanda Associação Cívica de Cabinda, 2003, *Cabinda um ano de dor*, Mpalabanda, Luanda; 3rd report, Mpalabanda Associação Cívica de Cabinda 2004, *Cabinda o reino da impunidade*, Mpalabanda, Luanda; also Amnesty International, December 2002, *Arbitrary detention/Fear for safety/Fear of torture/Incommunicado detention*, Ref.:AI, 133/2002; available online at: [<http://www.amnesty.org/>]
- ⁷¹ This day commemorates the signature of the Simulambuco Treaty on January 22, 1885, whereby the African princes and governors of Cabinda requested to become a Portuguese protectorate and the Portuguese guaranteed the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Cabinda and the respect for the cultural traditions of its people. This treaty is commonly mentioned to support the arguments of all those sustaining the independence of Cabinda in relation to Angola. For a deeper discussion of such arguments see 1977, *A Independência de Cabinda*, Lisbon, 1977 (name of the author not provided).
- ⁷² *Angonoticias*, October 10, 2006: *Actos de Vandalismo na Igreja Católica em Cabinda, Preocupa Diocese*; available online at [http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=11797].
- ⁷³ Amnesty International, August 4, 2006, *Angola: Human Rights Organization Banned*, Ref AI Index: AFR 12/006/2006; available online at: [<http://www.amnesty.org/>].

- ⁷⁴ See Vidal, N., "Multipartidarismo em Angola", ...op. cit., pp.11-57.
- ⁷⁵ See the arguments published by Marques, R., July 16, 2005, "Os povos da linha da frente", in *Semanário A capital*.
- ⁷⁶ Independent Task Force Report to the Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, *More than humanitarianism*...op. cit., especially pp. 32-33, 49-50; also Aguilar, R., 2005, *Angola: getting off*...op. cit., especially pp. 13-18; Miranda, A., 2004, *Angola 2003/2004*... op. cit.; also forthcoming, Chabal, P. 2007 'E Pluribus Unum: transitions in Angola', in Chabal, P. & Vidal, N. (eds) *Angola: the weight of history*, Hurst & Co. & Indiana University Press, London & Bloomington Indiana.; also Chabal, P., 2006, 'Prefácio' in Vidal, N. & Pinto de Andrade, J. (eds), *O processo de transição para o multipartidarismo em Angola*, Firmamento, Luanda & Lisboa, pp.xvii-xxxviii.
- ⁷⁷ Lu's Araújo, coordinator of SOS-Habitat; from a private interview with the author in Lisbon, August 14, 2006.
- ⁷⁸ On the idea of a Regional Observatory for Human Rights see Motala, A., Vidal, N., Figou, P. & Govender, V., 2005, *An Assessment of Human Rights Defender initiatives in Southern Africa*, Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa – Niza, Amsterdam.