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## **The international institutionalisation of patrimonialism in Africa The case of Angola<sup>1</sup>**

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This chapter (divided in two parts) examines development assistance strategies towards sub-Saharan Africa over the past thirty years, with particular reference to Angola.

Part one summarises the evolution of development thinking and the strategies that have influenced major international donor agencies, from the 1980s onwards, including neo-liberal and neo-Marxist approaches. During the first transition phase it is argued that civil society held a central role in development assistance thinking (offering perspectives such as participatory development, *empowerment* and development from below) but ended by again conceding its place to the State, with a gradual acceptance of neo-liberal currents of thought (in its most moderated, social-democratic, form).

The neo-liberal/social democratic current refers to what has become known as Institutional Thinking, promoting institutional support to beneficiary States through the national budget. Civil society is restricted to exercising a supportive and complementary role, by contributing to government policies. The notion of civil society has gradually been losing ground to the wider and more flexible concept of Non-State Actors (e.g. Cotonou Agreement), which is inclusive of the business sector. Contrary to stated objectives, the end result of these strategies will not be the gradual and progressive reform of beneficiary regimes and systems, but rather their strengthening by means of bureaucratic and legal change, progress and modernisation. Patrimonial and clientelistic structures, now operate within an international globalised context and various interrelated public/private, African/foreign entities, remain untouched. To date, the net result of new Institutional Thinking is the institutionalization of neo-patrimonialism in Africa.

Part two takes Angola as a case study, where the effects of evolving donor strategies, as described in part one, are concretely seen. The period in which CSOs, Civil Society Organisations, took the lead in donor strategies (from the beginning of the transition in 1990 until the mid-late 90s), has given way to the State reassuming centre stage (since the end of the 1990s). Substantial change in the national and international context, married to Institutional Thinking, leads many inter-governmental organisations and international NGOs into promoting a position of '*constructive engagement*' between CSOs and the State, as well as promoting representative and unifying structures for CSOs. Various programmes and initiatives drive this new agenda forward, the most

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problematic being the European Union's Programme of Support to Non-State Actors. Critical CSOs characterise such a strategy as collaborationist, one of apolitical homogenisation, induced subordination and cooptation. This results in humanising regime appearance without changing it, while the plight of the neediest in countries where the human development ranking dignifies no one, and the exercise of human rights is restricted, sees no substantial improvement.

## PART - I

### Apparent Agents of Democracy in Africa

With the end of the Eastern Bloc and the wave of transitions in Africa in the 1990s, we witnessed the hope-filled 'theorisation' of the transformative role of three structuring agents of democracy: political opposition parties, an emerging business movement, and civil society (in its diverse facets: media, NGOs, associations, Churches, and unions to some degree, all consciously monitoring management of public affairs). These agents of 'democracy' would supposedly be capable of developing their 'role' in Africa, if guaranteed civil and political liberties (freedom of association and expression), economic freedoms (freedom of initiative and private property), and institutionalised processes for the peaceful handover of power, through frequent, free and universal multiparty elections.

Almost two decades after the transition process began, the reality has revealed itself to be rather different. The engagement of these three agents was not exactly what had been expected.

Somewhat deceptively in the vast majority of cases, the behaviour of political opposition parties and elections failed to bring substantial change, especially since so few opposition parties rose to power. The same appropriation and private distribution of public funds prevailed, with perhaps some greater inclusion of beneficiaries but without ever altering the deep socio economic imbalances which characterise neo-patrimonial systems, impeding development processes as currently understood.

Realising that opposition parties would not effect change, 'hope' gravitated to the emerging business class (drawn from informal markets), where one could apparently see entrepreneurial traits of a 'Schumpeterian' nature which, given the opportunity to express itself freely and legally, would create a strong middle class, capable of challenging *status quo* fundamentals. Once again results disappointed: the supposed entrepreneurs of the informal market did not evolve into modern business people nor did they give birth to a new and productive system. Instead one witnessed the privatisation of State assets for the benefit of the old political guard, also now in business, but more likely to accumulate capital rather than saving, investing and being productive. Above all they were more willing to align with foreign capital and favour an extraverted economic orientation (e.g. Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In non-socialist countries, this privatisation process in favour of the political elite (which some of my interviewees in Angola ironically described as the 'primitive accumulation of capital') as seen with Nigeria in 1967, led to the Nigerisation of the economy as stated by Gowon, or in the case of the former Zaire, with the 'Zaireanisation' of Copper, decreed by Mobutu in 1975.

In the first half of the 1990s, the failure of the transformative role of opposition politics and of the apparently emerging business class became clear. This left CSOs, which had come to exercise a role in social service provision in various African countries, substituting many State functions, and implementing local participatory development strategies (e.g. Angola, DRC, Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). In spite of many weaknesses and constraints, various national and foreign NGOs came to play a role in political criticism, monitoring and proposing public policies, often replacing opposition parties, which were generally ineffective, concerned as they were to secure access to the distribution of spoils of public resources.

Until the late 1990s, the greatest engagement in promoting and defending democratic values, as well as development support and investment in the social services, were to be found within CSOs and the Churches. These became the preferred channels of assistance, seen as more credible than the State, which was increasingly immersed in serious corruption and diversion of development funds.<sup>4</sup> While assuming greater aid delivery effectiveness to beneficiary populations, investment in CSOs in Africa presented certain advantages to the donor community, with national CSOs working in partnership (under 'tutelage') with international NGOs – employing thousands of expatriates from major donor countries to supervise expenditure and projects, apparently contributing to capacity building local partners.

This increased CSO involvement was accompanied by a process of reflection and 'theorisation' by various currents within international development thinking on civil society. During a period of political and ideological thawing, and of change in the international context, the concept began to be moulded and shaped from different perspectives.

Neo-Marxist developmentalist thought of the late 1970s and 80s engaging on issues of *empowerment*, participative development, and reform of the international institutions of power, acknowledged popular resistance within the space for civil society, and of the possibility for more effective and stable gradual and peaceful 'revolution' by the impoverished majorities exploited and oppressed by authoritarian regimes (military and civilian). These were to be united within a civically conscious movement seeking to reform political and economic power relations,<sup>5</sup> where the local linked up with regional and international levels (e.g. the World Social Forum process, which started in Brazil in 2001, would be an example of this globally aware and organised process).

By contrast neo-liberal thinkers explored civil society from a different perspective, emptying it of its ideological baggage and of a macro-structural power relations analysis, at the national (of so-called developing countries), regional or international levels. Civil society came to be understood within an instrumentalist and functional view of democracy, from a micro, short-term and sectoral dimension. It faced a multiplicity of gradual reformist functions, from the implementation of social projects for needy populations, to monitoring authorities and public services in specific sectors (health, education, environment, agriculture, food security, etc.), in order to make them more *accountable*. It also served as the space for the exercise of freedom of expression, association and initiative, alleviating tension within historically authoritarian societies, favouring greater political,

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<sup>4</sup> See, for instance, the paper of Maliana Marcelino Serrano in this volume.

<sup>5</sup> Vidal, Nuno, *Strategies of participatory development stimulating entrepreneurial abilities: the 'Kuije 91' project in Malange/ Angola* (Lisbon: ISCTE, 1997) MA dissertation.

economic and social stability, and supporting the peaceful exchange of power between opposing parties. Here we have a division between 'orthodox'<sup>6</sup> and moderate tendencies, which adopted a social-democratic character, sometimes also called Institutional Thinking which prevails within major international organisations and donor agencies, and is visible in such key reference documents as the Cotonou Agreement and the Millennium Declaration.<sup>7</sup>

With little funding and few opportunities for action, Neo-Marxist strategies were replaced by those of neo-liberals. The rise of neo-liberal strategies (moderate social-democratic form) is owed above all to the growing influence of this perspective within the structures of major international organisations and principal donors (European Union, United Nations, World Bank, IMF, USAID, bilateral cooperation and development agencies, and innumerable international NGOs). The prevailing notion of civil society was clearly western, neo-liberal, techno-bureaucratic, reformist, but always from a short-term sectoral and micro perspective, within specific communities, as I now discuss.

### **The loss of civil society prominence and the dominance of the State - neo-liberal/social democratic Institutional thinking**

Different factors would lead to change in development thinking and strategies in the late 1990s, with the State slowly returning to centre stage at the expense of civil society. From a civil society perspective, regardless of a decade long investment and activities conducted, CSOs manifested certain inadequacies and were far from being the pivotal agent of social and political change that was unrealistically expected from them. They revealed themselves to be highly dependent on external finance, and on imposed outside agendas, which were regularly altered by partners and the donor community in response to the 'fashions' of the time (malaria, HIV, environment, civic rights, electoral education, etc.). Also in many cases there was significant overlap with political power, and many suffered from the same clientelistic culture prevalent in the governing sphere of the State.<sup>8</sup> Finally, most CSOs would not survive without external finance.

CSOs difficulty in networking at the national, regional and international levels was also clear, partly explained by the international donor strategy dominated by neo-liberal, micro, sectoral and short-term perspectives. Furthermore, a national CSO policy and strategy (ideology) to clearly and independently share joint principles and positions regarding donors and international partners, was poorly defined or non-existent. The best functioning national and regional networks were those

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<sup>6</sup> Echoed in the work of Collier and others; see Collier, Paul & Venables, Tony, *Trade and economic performance: does Africa's fragmentation matter?*, Oxford University Economics Department, May 2008 unpublished, available at <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/africa.htm>; also Collier, Paul, "Naive faith in the ballot box: the catastrophe in Congo is a grave international failure. Hasty elections can make things worse", *The Guardian* (3 November 2008); Anten, L., *Strengthening Governance in Post-Conflict Fragile States*, Clingendael issues paper (9 June 2009); Herbst, Jeffrey & Mills, Greg, "There is No Congo", in *Foreign Policy*, web exclusive, publication accessed on August 15 2009, located at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com>

<sup>7</sup> See, "The Cotonou Agreement"; *Partnership Agreement ACP-EC*, signed in Cotonou on June 23 2000, revised in Luxembourg on June 25 2005 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006), located at <http://ec.europa.eu>; United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly Resolution A/55/L.2, September 18 2000, located at [www.un.org/millennium/summit.htm](http://www.un.org/millennium/summit.htm); *The Cotonou Agreement, A User's Guide for Non-State Actors*, compiled by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (Brussels: ACP Secretariat, November 2003) accessed at [www.acpsec.org](http://www.acpsec.org).

<sup>8</sup> See the Introduction by Patrick Chabal and chapter by Carlos Figueiredo in this volume.

dealing with specific areas (e.g. HIV-AIDS, gender, land), but once they engaged a wider political context, relating poverty to existing political systems, donor strategies, regional geo-strategic interests, or economic and political relations with other states, such initiatives tend to become fragmented and ineffective.<sup>9</sup>

Even for the minority who had coherently engaged in participative, communitarian, bottom-up, and empowering development strategies – producing encouraging results at a local level, in resolving concrete community problems (e.g. more participative organisation within decision making structures, management of local health posts, schools, sanitation, reclaiming basic community public services, etc.) – had failed to generate a national dynamic enabling them to work for substantive change at the macro governance level, even less to change political and economic structures. What was absent at the community level and in the CSO leadership, was a qualitative 'reflection-action' leap from the micro level (local communities and immediate problems) to the macro (national, governance, State organisation). Social interrelations remained very fragmented, as did 'public/ national' solidarity and awareness.<sup>10</sup>

From the perspective of those who controlled the State, while donors strategies of channelling aid through CSOs had strengthened them at certain levels (namely it their role of monitoring public policies) and made it more difficult to appropriate and divert part of these funds, in many respects it also engendered less accountability and expenditure by government, with public social sectors increasingly supported by international organisations. Decreasing public expenditure left more public resources available for appropriation at a central level. Such a strategy also further weakened government awareness and sensitivity towards the social sectors and needs of the poor - the majority.

Added to these realities in the 1990s were the growing phenomena of warlordism and criminalisation of the State (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Nigeria),<sup>11</sup> and possible Somalisation of other countries, a process which tended to transform modern patrimonialism into what I term post-modern patrimonialism.<sup>12</sup>

It was within this context that Western 'developmentalist' currents of thought (of a neo-liberal/social democratic inclination), and different strategies for action in Africa, rediscovered the necessity to improve and invest heavily in the modern bureaucratic-administrative State. These strategies were visible in various State-building programmes dealing with the national budget, which gained currency in the late 1990s (with the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). During the first decade of the new century, they were further evident in such key aid strategy documents, as the Declaration on Harmonisation adopted in Rome (February 2003), the Marrakech Roundtable on Managing for Development Results (February 2004),<sup>13</sup> the Paris Declaration on Aid

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<sup>9</sup> Ahmed Motala, Nuno Vidal, Piers Pigou & Venitia Govender *An Assessment of Human Rights Defender initiatives in Southern Africa*, a report for the Netherlands Institute of Southern Africa, NiZA (Amsterdam: NiZA, June 2005).

<sup>10</sup> Vidal, Nuno, *Strategies of participatory development*, *op. cit.*; Vidal, Nuno, 'Modern and Post-Modern Patrimonialism in Africa: the Angolan case' in *Community & the State in Lusophone Africa*, edited by Malyn Newitt with Patrick Chabal & Norrie MacQueen (London: King's College London, 2003), pp.1-14.

<sup>11</sup> Reno, William, *Warlord Politics and African States* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

<sup>12</sup> Vidal, Nuno, 'Modern and Post-Modern...*op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness expresses the international community's consensus on the direction for reforming and managing aid delivery to achieve improved effectiveness and results. It is grounded in five mutually

Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008),<sup>14</sup> and the previously mentioned Cotonou Agreement (2000 & 2005) and Millennium Declaration (2000).

Such strategic repositioning was operationalised throughout this decade in different programmes (especially the European Union), whose major new idea is the gradual substitution of the concept of civil society by the concept of Non State Actors, including traditional CSOs, Churches, trade unions, and surprisingly, the private sector.<sup>15</sup> In this way, the private sector would apparently become more involved in making the corporate social responsibility agenda a reality, becoming jointly accountable in solving the social problems of the poorest (clearly a social-democrat argument). Thus, a broad partnership strategy for development was supposed to come into existence, involving the State, donor and Non State Actors, visible internationally in such generalised and depoliticised objectives as the Millennium Development Goals (2000), focusing more on manifestations of poverty (insufficient education, gender inequality, infant mortality, deficient maternal healthcare, HIV and malaria, environmental issues), than on its causes (political-economic structures and power relations at national, regional and international levels).

In this way, the State reclaimed its primordial place within donor strategies. The development assistance of major donors became a process of greater articulation between donors (Paris Declaration principles on 'harmonization' and 'alignment'),<sup>16</sup> supporting beneficiary State budgets and development programmes, with absolute respect for sovereignty, a concept abandoned in Europe but restored for Africa by the European Union:

*States shall determine the development strategies for their economies and societies in all sovereignty (Cotonou Agreement, article 2).<sup>17</sup>*

A complementary role was reserved for civil society in partnership with the private sector, given its potential contribution to national development strategies:

*...the Parties recognise the complementary role of, and potential for, contributions by non-state actors to the development process (article 4).<sup>18</sup>*

Various CSOs were listened to within this process, but the CSOs present in Accra stated they were 'disappointed that our views on previous drafts have not been taken into account, and that the Accra Agenda for Action as it stands, promises little change'.<sup>19</sup>

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reinforcing principles: Ownership: partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and coordinate development actions; Alignment: donors base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions, and procedures; Harmonization: donors' actions are more harmonized, transparent, and collectively effective; Managing for results: Managing resources and improving decision making for development results; Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. The Declaration on Harmonisation and the Marrakech Roundtable report are available at <http://www.aidharmonization.org/>

<sup>14</sup> The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, located at <http://www.oecd.org/>

<sup>15</sup> See *The Cotonou Agreement, A User's Guide for Non-State Actors*, compiled by The ECDPM - European Centre for Development Policy Management (Brussels: ACP Secretariat, November 2003) located at [www.acpsec.org](http://www.acpsec.org).

<sup>16</sup> See Part II of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (especially pp.4-7) at <http://www.oecd.org/>

<sup>17</sup> See *The Cotonou Agreement, A User's Guide...op. cit.*, article 2, located at [www.acpsec.org](http://www.acpsec.org).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* article 2.

<sup>19</sup> See *Civil society statement in Accra warns urgency for action on aid*, Accra, September 1, 2008, p.2; available at [http://www.betteraid.org/downloads/Final\\_CS0\\_Statement\\_Accra010908%5B1%5D.doc](http://www.betteraid.org/downloads/Final_CS0_Statement_Accra010908%5B1%5D.doc)

Irrespective of the various regimes' anti-democratic 'sins' (DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, etc.), donor strategies generally agreed to work with the holders of State power, 'hopeful' for gradual reform within these regimes through institutional strengthening, assistance and cooperation, and the adoption of legal frameworks and principles based on a legal State in the modern (Western) sense. The process of transition towards democracy in the long term would also hopefully count on the progressive restructuring of regional structures, such as the African Union, and the adoption of general democratic principles for its members, such as respect for Human Rights and maintaining the practice of frequent multiparty elections.

This strategic repositioning of the State, ignores deep political issues on how power relations are structured: at national level - the appropriation and very unequal distribution of public resources; at the regional level - where similar regime leaders mutually protect each other in regional institutions of international standing (e.g. the role of the AU in the Zimbabwean or Kenyan crisis); or at the international level - external commercial and financial relations regarding natural resource exploration in partnerships with African and foreign institutions (public and private), competing for strategic resources (e.g. the case of Asia and the West for oil and other minerals). The Paris Declaration makes vague and isolated references to the need for engagement in resolving challenges such as corruption and the lack of transparency, but without touching on the fundamental issues of governance and power relations regarding how these countries are structured internally and within the international system, and the impact of this on poverty.

It is natural that the dilution of CSOs within depoliticised and essentially techno-bureaucratic strategies, their insertion into such a broad category as Non State Actors, and their increasing dependency on funds channelled through the State budget (managed by government institutions and whose office holders have worked for decades in clientelistic and patrimonial regimes), implies emptying some CSOs of their political and confrontational work regarding governance, and reducing their effectiveness as monitors of government action. CSOs are increasingly pressurised to reduce their activity to that of providing technical support and resolving social issues within communities, fearing reprisals if they offer political critique of government. Donors find it difficult to avoid discriminating against politically troublesome CSOs in accessing resources from the national budget. Legislation becomes a useful weapon within the regime, through which it can prescribe that only CSOs fulfilling certain criteria have access to public funds, which in turn requires approval from other State institutions. This process is capable of indefinitely blocking the provision of funds by means of all sorts of bureaucratic and legal requirements (e.g. the statute of public utility in Angola, to which primarily regime or pro-regime CSOs have access, as we will see in part II).

This repositioning of aid strategies ended up making it easy for many African governments who had argued for the depoliticisation of civil society, accused of not having the legitimacy to interfere in politics (at the level of debate and preparation of public policies), to argue that it did not enjoy the voter legitimacy given to political parties in elections.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Sabine Fiedler-Conradi (2003) "Strengthening Civil Society in Zambia", study conducted to inform a focal area strategy paper, commissioned by the German Development Service (DED) on behalf of German Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ), Lusaka/ Munich; also Lifuka, Rueben L. & Habasonda, Lee M., 'A Sociedade Civil e o Poder Político na Zâmbia' in Vidal, Nuno & Pinto de Andrade, Justino (eds.), *Sociedade Civil e Política em Angola* (Luanda & Lisboa: Firmamento, Universidade de Coimbra & Universidade Católica de Angola, 2008), p. 385-393.

From a realistic perspective, this is rather convenient for the governments of major donor countries who, on the one hand maintain support to civil society – albeit much reduced, (appeasing the western humanist public conscience) – while ensuring progress in business relations (public and private) without antagonising the regimes with which they wish to maintain good economic relations, especially during an international economic recession and given tough competition from Asia and South America (especially Brazil).

Changes in donor strategy towards a more technocratic and depoliticised approach will have few problems being implemented on the ground, given that national organisations are very dependent on external agendas and finance, and the local structures of international organisations (governmental and non-governmental) are dominated by a large ‘techno-careerist’ development army. Its members move between different countries, continents and organisations at the sniff of employment opportunities and socio-professional betterment. While attracted by the exotic and the aura of development, they are deprived of political and ideological awareness. Those with political awareness do not express it openly or even put it into practice, due to the problems this would cause their careers (difficulties in obtaining work visas, maintaining employment in organisations which do not wish to be expelled from the country, or persecuted in different ways by the censoring and oppressive mechanisms of these regimes, etc.).

It is important here to distinguish between this ‘techno-careerist’ majority, depoliticised in their work, and a minority of ‘activists’, who have not numbed their awareness or politically questioning action, but believe in changing the reality where they work, even if this means personal cost and sacrifice (which it nearly always does), adopting a militant and/or mission stance. They are in fact development agents, but represent a minority who find it hard to make ends meet.

### **The ‘institutionalisation’ of Patrimonialism**

To date State capacity building has largely resulted in more technocratic and administrative effectiveness of beneficiary States in ministerial administration and some services, in controlling and limiting the private appropriation of public resources at lower administrative levels (avoiding the predatory and anarchic appropriation of regimes such as those of Mobutu and Charles Taylor, especially in their latter years), but not at the highest levels of the distributive pyramid. Greater control of State resources and revenues at the lower and intermediate levels of State administration could, for example, be achieved in partnership with foreign businesses, (a form of outsourcing or consultancy), as happened in Mozambique and Angola in relation to British companies managing the customs services at ports and airports.

This basically meant that more revenues were deposited in State accounts and that appropriation at the lower and intermediate levels within the patrimonial pyramid was reduced. It does not mean that the management of State resources by those in power at the highest levels (who control the State accounts) became more transparent or equitable in the administration of these resources. Regarding distribution, above all, it implies that the whole system is more dependent on those at the centre, absolutely crucial for the proper functioning of any modern patrimonial system.

The State building or institutional strengthening strategy remains at the level of formal appearance for functioning institutions, not altering the structure or the operational logic of neo-patrimonial



political systems. The demands for multi-party elections, the legislative guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, and of respect for human rights, are rendered more formal and ritualistic than effective.<sup>21</sup>

Similarly, the all encompassing partnership between Non State Actors and the State ends up strengthening the controlling functions of existing systems. It conspires to silence or diminish the most critical and aggressive (politically disconcerting voices) within civil society, which made demands and monitored public policy for the poorest, questioning and opposing the brushing aside of human rights, denouncing cases of embezzlement and corruption.

The system therefore becomes more effective but it remains, controllable and secure for its main managers and beneficiaries.<sup>22</sup> In reality, these systems refined their operational mechanisms/structures creating a more complex, sophisticated and modern appearance of the State, increasingly engaged in external, political, diplomatic and economic-financial affairs. Or expressed more simply, in creating a combination of international and national transactions of State and private agents (African or foreigner), which become indistinguishable. A network of complicity is created between public and private, national and foreign sectors, all taking advantage of the appropriation mechanisms in place.

By way of example, one highlights the manner of public resource appropriation conducted in the 1980s and 90s, when the diversion of public money was frequent, and holders of government office were paid commissions into their foreign bank accounts. This type of appropriation and distribution actually requires much caution and camouflage. A consequence of the blatant and primitive predatory nature of Mobutism was to serve as an example of how not to do things, to ensure that one could later avoid facing international justice which continues to hover like a black cloud over many African presidents, besides Bashir and Charles Taylor.

Gradually, a growing concern emerges to avoid awarding public contracts directly to private companies, whose owners or family members are recognised public office holders. A much safer option is the creation of a chain or network of companies between business people and trusted, loyal associates (national and/or foreigner), where public office holders participate indirectly, secretly managing the whole scheme.

They continue to make the same old business transactions profitable, which are disastrous for the country itself, such as over-charging for goods and services provided by private companies; awarding contracts not based on competence for carrying out state projects or providing goods and services to the State; inflated awards paid by the State to private companies for meeting deadlines; payment of astronomical fines to private companies for failure by the State to fulfil contractual clauses; commissions paid to private individuals representing the State in business with private companies, etc.<sup>23</sup> The manner of appropriation is more complex, concealed and 'modern'.

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<sup>21</sup> See chapter by Benjamim Castello in this volume.

<sup>22</sup> On the DRC, see for example, Englebert, P., *Why Congo persists: Sovereignty, globalization and the violent reproduction of a weak state* (Oxford: Queen Elisabeth House Working Paper Series, 2003); Angola is also a good example, analysed in part II of this paper.

<sup>23</sup> See declaration of the Angolan ambassador to Brazil, Alberto Correia Neto in *O Globo* (21st November 2005), cit. in Vidal, Nuno, "The Angolan regime and the Move to Multiparty Politics" in Chabal, Patrick & Vidal, Nuno, *Angola, the weight of history* (London & New York: Hurst & Columbia, 2007), pp. 124-174.

In wealthier countries where international commercial relations are more intense and deal with significant volumes (e.g. oil producers), a new world of options is made available with the possibility of accessing international financial markets and the range of existing devices which facilitate camouflage, such as offshore companies and accounts, broadly encompassing State-private business consortia and financial consultants highly specialised in these operations. Several possibilities of disguise and legitimisation for office holders emerge, such as creating foreign anonymous societies in offshore accounts which includes foreign business partners scattered overseas, who then participate in consortia with companies doing business with the State. Contract adjudication is approved by the same State office holders supposedly representing the State's interest. Preferably, these consortia involve renowned multinationals and foreign State companies (who effectively provide the technical skill and ensure the work is at least done, aware of the 'need' to structure the consortium in those terms, including the 'offshore' partner), thus rendering foreign companies accomplices and helping to legitimise the whole process. The profits will later be paid as dividends to company associates in several parts of the world (perfectly legal), where one finds the same State office holders or individuals they trust. In short, we are dealing with international laundering processes, which privately appropriate public resources.

One can say that these mechanisms and constructs are globalised, frequently encountered, and in permanent development in the West. They are, not an invention of post-independence neo-patrimonial systems. In the West, the difference, however, is found elsewhere, in a strong civil society and public opinion with power to influence and protect the common good, with effective separation of judicial, executive and legislative powers. This is not found in countries with fragile civil societies with highly personalised regimes, which confuse persons and institutions, irrespective of existing legislation, and where the overwhelming majority of office holders within the three powers are among the principal direct beneficiaries of the appropriation system, who fail to exercise their monitoring or regulation roles, but rather assist in concealing what is happening.<sup>24</sup>

### **Weaknesses of interpretation among neo-liberals and neo-Marxists**

For different reasons, both neo-liberal (orthodox and social-democratic) and neo-Marxists, show a strong resistance in accepting African political analysis from within these systems, which makes clear its own internal operational logic and capacity to resist outside influences. Above all, the difficulty in accepting this is located in their strong ideological 'prejudice', which can be politically characterised as from the Western 'right' and 'left wing'.

In neo-liberal approaches, the disappearance of the Eastern Bloc, the generalised unconditional acceptance of the market economy by the majority of regimes, including those formerly Socialist,

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<sup>24</sup> See for example, Global Witness media briefing, *Angola: private oil firm has shareholders with same names as top government officials*, (4 August 2009); denouncing a private oil firm given permission by the state oil company Sonangol to bid for potentially lucrative oil rights, but including shareholders such as the Sonangol's chairman, senior presidential advisers, and a former finance minister. See also the investigation of Rafael Marques who denounced what has become 'generalised practice in Angola', whereby State officials at the highest levels of Government, the Judicial system (including the Attorney-General and presiding judge of the Angolan Military Supreme Court), Angolan Armed Forces, National Police, National Assembly and even the President's office, combine public duties with private interests; Marques, Rafael, *The Business Activities of the Attorney-General of the Republic*, in *Semanário Angolense*, nº 329 (15-21 August 2009).

and the Asian competition for strategic resources, means that an analysis highlighting neo-patrimonial governance and the exposure of alliances with external partners, become uncomfortable regarding the economic relations one hopes to develop.

As we have seen, the established commercial and financial relations within the new post-Cold War context have in reality strengthened the existing patrimonial logic and *rentier* economy, maintaining resource exploitation and perpetuating the *status quo*. In practice, these external relations represent important alliances for neo-patrimonial regimes, creating a legitimising network of 'accomplices' (at least by omission)<sup>25</sup> within the system of elite public resource appropriation and the perpetuation of poverty for the majority. This is an inconvenient reality for the economic and political pragmatism of the 'right'.

On the other hand, analytical neo-Marxist approaches (either class conflict and dependency theory) have difficulty in accepting that the existing system is not an exclusive product of Machiavellian and bourgeois elites, aligned to international capital in usurping State resources and condemning the majority population to a life of misery. There is a serious inability to accept that the structure, survival and resilience of post-colonial African political systems,<sup>26</sup> depend on a logic of appropriation and distribution, shared by the overwhelming of the population – that is an acceptance the one reaps rewards according to one's position within the distributive pyramid - wretched survival for the majority at the bottom, self-enrichment and opulence for a minority at the higher levels, closest to the Boss (the President).<sup>27</sup> Moreover, neo-patrimonial analysis clearly goes against the prevailing post-colonial social sciences tradition of politically atoning for colonial sins - a type of contritional act - translated into the need to paternalistically and systematically excuse poor African governance. Instead they point to the international dimension as the explanatory factor, understating the importance of governance in Africa, as if the majority of African polities had not exhaustively demonstrated their resilience, their unchanged logic with whatever international system existed, irrespective of the Cold War. By undervaluing the historical pathway of post-colonial African political systems, these perspectives refuse to accept that reform of major multilateral institutions, although necessary, cannot be a sufficient condition for substantive change in Africa.

Both neo-Marxist and neo-liberal perspectives still have faith in the change they believe is occurring in developing countries (a concept itself premised on the assumption of a dynamic of Western development), though they differ in their interpretation of the rhythm and direction of the supposed change taking place. Fundamental political positions (or 'ideological prejudice') prevent acceptance that African polities have their own logic and that neo-patrimonial roots are capable of surviving and deepening in different contexts.

If this is not the case, then what has substantively changed from the Mobutu administration to those of Kabila-father and Kabila-son (even with the legitimisation of Joseph Kabila in the July-October 2006 multi-party elections)? What substantive neo-patrimonial political and *rentier* system

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<sup>25</sup> I use the expression 'complicity by omission' (cumplicidade por omissão) of the Angolan activist Luís Araújo of SOS Habitat, who frequently used the phrase in conversations with me to describe the relationship of various Western powers with the Angola regime regarding disrespect for Human Rights.

<sup>26</sup> South Africa is clearly excluded here, because of its different trajectory in terms of industrial and proletariat processes, which did not happen in other sub-Saharan African countries.

<sup>27</sup> Vidal, Nuno, 'Modern and Post-Modern...op. cit..

changes are found in Ali Bongo inheriting the presidential 'throne' from his father Omar Bongo, in Gabon (subsequently legitimised for the West in multi-party elections held for this purpose in August 2009)? What change can be verified in the fundamentals of the Nigerian political-economic system in the transition from a military to a civil regime (1999), or the change of civil administration from Obasanjo to Yar'Adua in 2007, with massive private appropriation of State resources (mainly oil), based on a complex distributive equilibrium and various clientelistic solidarities? What type of alternative and fundamental change is effected by the post-electoral 'negotiations' of March 2008 in Zimbabwe, after massive electoral fraud, accommodating apparent contradictory rivals like Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara (a crony agreement with a simple division of places and State spoils, without any coherent political project, pressurised and supported by the African Union and South Africa)? How should one interpret the negotiations and accommodation post/extra elections which followed the Kenyan elections in December 2007 (again with the complicity of AU and South Africa), between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, a scenario where results were manipulated and violently contested, in a country previously seen as a model of functioning democracy in Africa?

## **PART II**

### **Angola - a case study**

This second part, which analyses Angola, is illustrative of the trajectory described above, on development assistance strategies, and dealing with a neo-patrimonial system supported by immense financial resources from oil production (currently competing with Nigeria for the position of leading African oil producer). This state of affairs facilitates resistance to external conditionalities and to securing external alliances (private and State) to maintain the *status quo*, counting on generating competition between the West and East for the exploration and production of oil.

#### **Transition and emergence of CSOs**

At the time of independence, a slow but progressive and continuous process took root in Angola, bringing about an erosion of public consciousness and social solidarity, as well as the decay of social sectors people strongly depend on: education, health, housing, social assistance, and community services. A distributive neo-patrimonial logic was covertly at work within a so-called socialist system, controlling and perverting collectivist principles and public consciousness, utilising the period of one-party rule and authoritarianism to impose itself effectively, which particularly impacted on the most vulnerable, the majority population, progressively excluded from the benefits derived from public resources.<sup>28</sup>

During the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the transition to multipartyism and a market economy, with a new legal framework for political and civic freedoms, brought a large number of international organisations to the country - from international government organisations to international NGOs, Church organizations, solidarity assistance, etc. Transnational networks

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<sup>28</sup> Independently of officially declared ideology, and contrary to what is sometimes argued, this dynamic during the two so-called Socialist administrations (1975-1979, 1979-1987), develops unperturbed during the multi-partyism transition process. This process was explored elsewhere, and hence will not be developed here; see Vidal, Nuno, "Social Neglect and the Emergence of Civil Society", in Chabal, Patrick & Vidal, Nuno, *Angola, the weight of history* (London: Hurst, 2007), pp. 200-235.

gathered together expatriate activists, local communities and a marginalised Angolan intellectual elite, including some middle and high level cadres. Joining forces, they began to work with those most in need of basic social support and progressively took over an ever expanding portfolio of State responsibilities in social sectors such as education, health, basic sanitation, housing, support to Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) and rural development. CSO civil political activity emerged similarly, denouncing social and humanitarian problems such as State neglect of social sectors, increasing poverty, the deplorable living conditions for the majority of the population, and advocating respect for human rights.<sup>29</sup>

Angolan CSOs emerged during this transition, benefitting greatly from the involvement and support of foreign organisations and the dynamics of transnational networks, whose support (financial, institutional and technical capacity) was vital in the struggle to survive, in a society controlled in all sectors by an authoritarian party-State.<sup>30</sup> However, if this involvement was essential to the development of CSOs, it also came to represent one of its major weaknesses, a serious dependency on foreign expertise, technical support and funding. As there was no private sector independent from the party and State structures,<sup>31</sup> there was no alternative for CSOs but to depend on external funding.

### **Government reaction**

At first, the government appeared not to pay much attention to the dynamic created through internal and external activism for three reasons. Firstly, new development perspectives (more participative and inclusive) were associated with development programmes, which apparently were of lesser importance compared to the prioritisation of humanitarian aid, when the war resumed in October 1992. Secondly, the Angolan government was primarily concerned with supervising the vast amounts of aid and its distribution to the interior of the country, defining project priorities and intervention areas (e.g. favouring government controlled areas to the detriment of those controlled by UNITA).<sup>32</sup> Thirdly, as soon as the war resumed after elections, an immediate effort was required to reinvest in weapons and the armed forces (significantly de-mobilised after the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords); international assistance became of greater importance to guarantee food supplies and some social services, freeing government of these concerns. The role of international cooperation moved from secondary to central importance, irrespective of the huge rise in oil revenues during this period: US\$2 billion in 1987, US\$3.5 billion in 1990, US\$5.1 billion in 1996, and US\$7 billion in 2000.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> See Vidal, Nuno, 'The genesis and development of the Angolan political and administrative system from 1975 to the present' in Kyle, Steve *Lusophone Africa: Intersections between Social Sciences* (Cornell, NY: Cornell Institute for African Development, May 2-3, 2003), pp. 1- 16.

<sup>31</sup> The privatisation process of the early nineties primarily benefited the nomenclature, see Aguilar, Renato, "Angola's private sector: rents distribution and oligarchy", in Karl Wohlmuth, Achim Gutowski, Tobias Knedlick, Mareike Meyn & Sunita Pitamber, *African Development Perspectives* (Germany: Lit Verlag, 2003); Aguilar, Renato, *Angola: getting off the hook*, a report for Sida (Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, 2005), especially pp. 13-18.

<sup>32</sup> Vidal, Nuno, *Strategies of participatory development...op. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> In Hodges, Tony, "The Economic Foundations of the Patrimonial State" in Chabal, Patrick & Vidal, Nuno, *Angola, the weight of history* (London: Hurst, 2007), pp. 175-199.

In the early 1990s, government concerns were largely directed towards the establishment of coordination mechanisms and managing the activities of international organisations, essentially through MINARS (Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration) and UTCAH (the Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid). This was initially under the supervision of the Council of Ministers and later MINARS.<sup>34</sup> Given that the international community preferred to channel international aid through the UN system, and national and international NGOs, instead of direct bilateral aid, these supervisory mechanisms were extremely important for a government seeking to maintain control and take advantage of the significant resources entering the country.

If at the beginning of the 1990s, government was not very concerned about the dynamic between national and international CSOs, for reasons already mentioned, in the mid- and late 1990s the situation changed substantially.

CSOs became more critical and increasingly troublesome for the regime, challenging the lack of government concern towards the decay and disruption of social sectors, documenting and publicising various situations of extreme poverty and pressurising government institutions to effect a change of attitude.<sup>35</sup> The private and international media echoed these demands. Opposition political parties sometimes joined this criticism (though rarely with the same commitment and force as the CSOs, for reasons explained elsewhere).<sup>36</sup>

The government/party in power reacted in a structured manner in the mid 1990s, investing heavily in a 'parallel civil society' comprised of organisations such as the president's foundation FESA (Fundação Eduardo dos Santos), created in 1996,<sup>37</sup> and later the Lwini Social Solidarity Fund of the First Lady Ana Paula dos Santos, both aiming to rehabilitate the political image of the president, selectively providing social services which are the responsibility of the State, and using social bonus funds from international oil companies. This strategy continues today with the creation or cooptation of other organisations, basically serving the need of the government and of the president to have a politically manipulated cooperative 'civil society', participating in politically sensitive processes (e.g. the approval of certain laws) without challenging them, thus meeting the international expectation that 'civil society' be consulted.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> UTCAH is also engaged with the Ministry of Planning; which ought not be confused with OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) of the United Nations, nor with UNTCU (*UN Transitional Coordination Unit*); in the provinces, the role of coordination and control was largely carried out by provincial governments; see Vidal, Nuno, *Strategies of participatory development...op. cit.*; also Vidal, Nuno, "Social Neglect...op. cit.

<sup>35</sup> See "Country profile Angola" in *An Assessment of Human Rights Defender initiatives in Southern Africa*, a report for the Netherlands Institute of Southern Africa – NiZA, by Ahmed Motala, Nuno Vidal, Piers Pigou and Venitia Govender (Amsterdam: NiZA, June 2005), pp.47-62.

<sup>36</sup> Vidal, Nuno, "The Angolan regime ...op. cit. p. 124-174.

<sup>37</sup> For further information on this foundation and investment of power within civil society, see Messiant, Christine, 'La Fondation Eduardo dos Santos (FESA): autour de l'investissement de la société civile par le pouvoir angolais', in *Politique Africaine*, 73, 1999, pp. 82-101.

<sup>38</sup> The National Agenda for Consensus, passed on April 3 2007 and promoted by the government, is an example of this type of initiative which requires CSO 'cooperation'; for more detail on the National Agenda for Consensus, see *Jornal de Angola* (June 20 2007); with respect to CSO parallels and regime needs, see Messiant, Christine, "The Mutation of Hegemonic Domination: Multiparty Politics Without Democracy", in Chabal, Patrick & Vidal, Nuno, *Angola, the weight of history* (London: Hurst, 2007), pp.93-123.

The *government friendly* or parallel CSOs gained privileged and facilitated access to government structures (and private sector, where the majority of companies followed the regime's patrimonial distributive logic), and to the legal status of public utilities, which grants access to public resources through the State budget.<sup>39</sup> Organisations not within these parameters increasingly experienced difficulties in conducting activities, directly proportionate to how much they challenged government.<sup>40</sup>

Growing internal constraints increased the external dependence of national CSOs (especially NGOs). This support however, experienced significant review in the late 1990s, as the internal-external scenario substantially changed.

### **Changes in the national and international context**

With the ending of the civil war following the death in combat of the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi (February 2002), and the signing of the Luena Peace Memorandum (April 2002), many hoped for rapid socio-political change, for substantial state investment in the social sectors at a time when it was estimated that 75% of the population of 14 million people lived on less than \$1 per day, and 2 million faced a high risk of hunger.<sup>41</sup>

The old excuse of the war could no longer be used to explain the lack of investment in these sectors. Above all, oil production increased and provided the government with an average of \$5 billion annually.<sup>42</sup> Various international reports continued to denounce poor management of oil revenues and endemic corruption in the political system, as well as other related activities exposed by the media.<sup>43</sup>

Within this context, international organisations such as *CARE International* and *MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières* accused the government of criminal negligence towards its own population.<sup>44</sup> Humanitarian aid reduced as a consequence, and the much awaited international donor conference was continually postponed, remaining conditional on agreement between the

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<sup>39</sup> See Vidal, Nuno, *Relatório da II Conferência da Sociedade Civil Angolana, 2008* (Luanda: Grupo de Coordenação da Sociedade Civil & Firmamento, 2009).

<sup>40</sup> Vidal, Nuno, "Sectores Sociais, Sociedade Civil, Política e Direitos Humanos em Angola" in Vidal, Nuno & Pinto de Andrade, Justino (eds.), *Sociedade Civil e Política em Angola* (Luanda e Lisboa: Firmamento, 2008), pp. 11-40.

<sup>41</sup> *The Guardian* (February 7 2003).

<sup>42</sup> From 2000 to 2003, Angola received an average of \$5 billion per year; see article 'Angola should be able to finance its own post war rebuilding' by Michael Dynes in *Times online* (February 24, 2003).

<sup>43</sup> According to the IMF, between 1997 and 2001, the whereabouts of \$8.45 billion of public funds are unknown (equal to 23% GDP), see *Time for transparency, coming clean on oil, mining and gas revenues, a report from Global Witness* (Washington: Global Witness, March 2004), p.35; Angola was then ranked 133 of 145 countries in relation to corruption by *Transparency International*, (145 being most corrupt), c.f. [www.transparencyinternational.com](http://www.transparencyinternational.com). Corruption scandals have been condemned since the 1990s in a range of reports, such as *A Rough Trade: the role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict*, a report by *Global Witness*, December 1998; *A Crude Awakening: the role of the oil and banking industries in Angola's civil war and the plunder of the state assets*, a report by *Global Witness*, December 1999; *All the Presidents' men*, a report by *Global Witness*, March 2002; *Angola public expenditure, management and financial accountability*, World Bank report n. 29036-AO, February, 16, 2005; McMillan, John, *The main institution in the country is corruption: creating transparency in Angola* (Stanford: Center on democracy, development and the rule of law, Stanford Institute of International Studies, February, 2005). Global Witness publications available at [www.oneworld.org/globalwitness](http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness)

<sup>44</sup> *Voz da América News Online* (June 11 2002); *The Guardian* (February 7 2003).

government and IMF, meant to establish accountability and transparency principles in the management of public accounts,<sup>45</sup> as well as the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy (*Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza*). Humanitarian assistance was suspended in certain regions (especially the Centre-North), no longer deemed to require such support.<sup>46</sup>

With the end of the UN presence in Angola fast approaching, UNOCHA (*United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*) was substituted by UNTCU (*United Nations Transitional Coordination Unit*; dependent on the *United Nations Development Programme - UNDP*), which was meant to handover coordination responsibilities to government, UTCAH and MINARS.

International pressure essentially aimed at improving governance and ensure more effective government involvement in the social sectors. Efforts to this effect, however, were not very effective. With new and more favourable loans (especially from China: \$4 billion without any conditionalities on transparency, good governance or respect for human rights),<sup>47</sup> the government ended up abandoning a donor conference and reaffirmed its autonomy in the face of external conditionalities. The government unilaterally designed its own development plans, prioritising macro-economic stability, with huge investment in infrastructure and technology transfer. Even though the Poverty Reduction Strategy was still mentioned in official documents, it was relegated in importance, losing the strategic importance it was meant to have in the post-2002 reconstruction process.<sup>48</sup> Also relegated were the social sectors, as can be seen in the evolution of the State budget.

State Budget: Social Sectors									
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008 *	2009
Education	5.06%	5.19%	6.24%	10.47%	7.14%	3.82%	6.63%	7.9%	7.9%
Health	5.03%	4.57%	5.82%	5.69%	4.97%	4.42%	4.70%	6.7%	8.38%
Social Security & Assistance	3.93%	3.36%	1.47%	4.30%	6.47%	9.66%	11.54%	9.6%	10.69%
Housing & Community Services	3.77%	2.14%	1.57%	3.07%	4.13%	6.51%	7.72%	5.1%	4.78%

<sup>45</sup> Angola needs to review its public accounts fiscal system and resource designation plan, equally needing to show greater transparency regarding oil accounts and budget rectitude (50% of expenditure was estimated to be conducted outside the national budget). National reconstruction was then estimated to cost around \$4 billion, with \$1.5 billion coming from participation by the international community; see *External Evaluation of SDC's Humanitarian Aid in Angola*, Commissioned by the Africa Division for Humanitarian Aid (HA) of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Berne, March 2004, p.5. For a summary of the relationship between the Angolan government and the IMF, see *Some transparency, no accountability, the use of oil revenue in Angola and its impact on Human rights*, Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 16, no. 1 (New York: HRW, January 2004), this report also exposes discrepancies in government accounts between income and expenditure from oil; see also *Human Rights Watch World Report 2006* (Washington: HRW, 2006), pp.74-79.

<sup>46</sup> Interview given to the author by Philippe Lazzarini, Chief Officer of the UN-OCHA – *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid* (Luanda, October 1 2004).

<sup>47</sup> See *More than humanitarianism: a strategic US approach toward Africa, report to the Council on Foreign Relations by an Independent Task-force* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), specially p. 32-33, 49-50; also Aguilar, Renato, *Angola: getting off the hook, op. cit.*, p. 2, 13-18. Although the amounts involved in Chinese credit lines are not known, it was estimated in 2007 to be between \$6-10 billion, in article by Alec Russell, "Investors sign up to Angola's miracle" (*Financial Times*, August 22, 2007).

<sup>48</sup> On the Strategy to Fight Poverty see Vidal, Nuno *PRS Country Briefing Paper, The Angolan Case* (Midrand/ South Africa: Southern Africa Trust, April 2009).



\* In 2008, the title 'Social Security and Assistance' was renamed 'Social Protection'.

Source: created by the author based on State Budget information for the specified years, available at [www.minfin.gov.ao](http://www.minfin.gov.ao)

Regarding the transfer of responsibility from UNTCU to UTCAH, the result was not exactly what had been desired. The government did not so much see the possibility for more effective involvement in coordinating of assistance and NGO projects as the opportunity to increase political control over CSO activities and finances. The new programme for NGO registration, which began in 2005, and has progressively been implemented to integrate all national and international NGOs, must be understood against this background. Registration procedures and demands for regular reports on NGO activities, specifying types of activities, projects, funding, equipment, personnel, socio-economic impact, etc, were the basis of an evaluation, as explained by the director of UTCAH, which his institution would issue to the Ministry of Justice regarding NGO projects and the level of partnership with government. With UTCAH issuing an opinion, the Ministry of Justice would approve or reject the registration of each NGO under review.<sup>49</sup>

In the face of rising oil prices, increasing Angolan production,<sup>50</sup> fierce global competition to secure future deliveries of crude (with Angola's new Asian partners gaining ground), the IMF, World Bank, and western democracies, gradually dropped their pressure for transparency, accountability and human rights.<sup>51</sup> In the new international geo-strategic context (energy), Angola has become a significant power capable of exerting leverage upon the international community, instead of the other way around (as had been the case during 1980s and 90s).<sup>52</sup> This power is not only over government and companies with interests in Angola, but equally over international government organisations and the donor community, whose most influential members have strong economic interests in Angola.

As a result, pressure was exerted over international NGOs operating in Angola, and their national partners, given that the vast majority of funding came from the same international sources. A sign of this was the moderated posture quickly adopted by the majority of international organisations working in Angola when faced with serious human rights violations in peri-urban communities,<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Explanation provided by Director of UTCAH in a meeting of *UTCAH with national and international NGOs* (Luanda: Auditorium of Catholic University of Angola, November 29 2005); agenda item: "(...) 3. Presentation of activities of national and international NGOs during first six months of 2005; 4. NGO Directory, information bulletin to be created, case study research, drafts of specific NGO reports to be presented throughout the year; 5. legalisation of NGOs (...); access to public funds".

<sup>50</sup> See Hodges, Tony, "The Economic Foundations of the Patrimonial State" in Chabal, Patrick & Vidal, Nuno, *Angola, the weight of history* (London: Hurst, 2007), pp. 175-199.

<sup>51</sup> See *Angola Strategy: Prioritizing U.S.- Angola Relations, a Report of an Independent Commission Sponsored by the Center for Preventive Action* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007); also *More than humanitarianism...op. cit.*, pp. 32-33, 49-50; also *Human Rights Watch World Report 2006 ...op. cit.*, pp.74-79; Aguilar, Renato, *Angola: getting off...op. cit.*, pp. 2, 13-18; also Reed, John, "Angola o capitalismo dos petrodiamantes" in *Courrier International* (November 25 2005), n.34, pp. 22-23.

<sup>52</sup> See Jad Mouawad "Nowadays, Angola Is Oil's Topic A", *The New York Times* (March 20, 2007); Miranda, Arlindo, *Angola 2003/2004, Waiting for Elections, a report for the Christian Michelsen Institute* (Norway: CMI, 2004); Chabal, Patrick, 'Introduction' in Chabal, Patrick & Vidal, Nuno, *Angola, the weight of history* (London: Hurst, 2007), pp. 1-18.

<sup>53</sup> See "Angola, 'They Pushed Down the Houses', Forced Evictions and Insecure Land Tenure for Luanda's Urban Poor", Human Rights Watch & SOS Habitat Report, Vol. 19, n°7 (A) (New York: HRW & SOS Habitat, May 2007), available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2007/angola0507/>; also *Angola, Lives in Ruins: Forced Evictions Continue, Amnesty International Report* (London: AI, January 2007), located at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR120012007>.

non registration of CSOs,<sup>54</sup> extinction of Cabindan CSO *MPalabanda*, veiled threats of deregistration of national and international NGOs,<sup>55</sup> constraints on media activities (including prison for journalists)<sup>56</sup>, closure of the United Nations Human Rights Office in Angola at the end of 2007, and the vitiated manner in which the electoral process was directed (e.g. the unequal composition of the national electoral commission, responsibilities given to electoral executive commissions which exceed the spirit of the Law, international non observance of the registration process, and the impossibility of Angolans in the diaspora voting).<sup>57</sup>

Organisations which previously publicly accused the government of criminal negligence towards its own populations, significantly restrained themselves and their opinions.<sup>58</sup> Many of so called international 'agents' of development, human rights and civil society (above all the 'techno-careerist' majority referred to earlier), knew the politically acceptable limits of their activity, quickly taking refuge within the emerging Institutional stream, adopting the technical discourse of State institutional strengthening as the new and correct route for development support.

### **Institutionalist thinking and constructive engagement**

The increased leverage of the Angolan regime over countries and international organisations, intersects with the previously explained new wave of international developmentalist approach – Institutional Thinking –, encountering an important and unexpected ally.

Within the new internal and external context, some intergovernmental organisations and international NGOs adopted a new role as promoters of a new perspective, of CSO '*constructive engagement*' with the State. These same organisations also adopted the role of intermediaries in the construction of new relationship mechanisms and structures between the government and national CSOs. This posture becomes evident in certain programmes and initiatives.

One such programme embodying this new posture (and the Institutional stream) is the European Union's 2007-08 Programme of Support to Non State Actors - NSA (*Programa de Apoio aos Actores Não Estatais - PAANE*). It has continued to further the liberal and flexible concept of NSA, with the objective of promoting social and political dialogue between these and national authorities at central and local levels. Supervision and implementation is shared by the Ministry of Planning and European Commission in Angola, but in practice the ultimate decision rests with the Angolan government, particularly the Ministry of Planning (so-called National Organiser, or the entity which authorises implementation of the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund Programme in Angola).

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<sup>54</sup> Such as Associação Justiça Paz e Democracia (AJPD).

<sup>55</sup> Such as *Open-Society Foundation - Angola, Mãos Livres* and *SOS Habitat*; see article by Mário Paiva in *A Capital* (Luanda: July 14 2007); also article by Reginaldo Silva in *Angolense* (Luanda: July 14 2007).

<sup>56</sup> This was the case with Graça Campos, journalist and chief-editor of *Semanário Angolense*, or of Fernando Lelo, Voice of America correspondent in Cabinda, imprisoned on November 11 2007, accused of instigating rebellion and crimes against the State. He was sentenced to 12 year, but freed on August 20 2009 on a lack of evidence.

<sup>57</sup> See Vidal, Nuno, *Plano Estratégico 2008-2010, Programa de Direitos Humanos, Construção da Democracia, Género e VIH/SIDA* (Luanda: Fundação Open Society, Angola, August 2007); also Vidal, Nuno, "Landmines of Democracy: Civil Society and the Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Angola" in Minnie, Jeanette (ed.), *Outside the Ballot Box: Preconditions for Elections in Southern Africa in 2005/6* (Windhoek: HiVOS, NiZA-Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa & MISA-Media Institute of Southern Africa, November 2006), pp. 65-87.

<sup>58</sup> *Voz da América News Online* (June 11 2002); *The Guardian* (February 7 2003).

The subordination of PAANE to the government is clear from funding contracts and support to NSA projects, which determine that:

*PAANE has the right to close or suspend financial contributions in advance, and interrupt payments, if: (...)*

*- PAANE is required to suspend or terminate financial contributions by any regional or national governmental institution or any court of law; (...)*

*- the financial contribution was granted by the European Commission and Angolan government, and if these request or demand that PAANE suspend or terminate financial contributions.<sup>59</sup>*

As the vast list of government's civic and political restrictions and conditionalities on CSOs is public knowledge, it is hard to understand how to strengthen NSAs, their autonomy, independence, as well as their critical and democratic capacity, if project approval, accompaniment and supervision from the beginning are conditional on government institutions, which could suspend financial support and suffocate the project at any moment. Clearly we are dealing with a serious conditionality, which is anti-democratic, induces self-censure and strengthens existing government mechanisms of control, repression and restriction of civil rights and freedoms.

Other initiatives promoting the new perspective include the *Civil Society Strengthening Programme (CSSP)* led by *Development Workshop (DW)* and *World Learning* (both international, though DW was the first NGO to work in Angola, the only one to establish itself during the Socialist era, 1981).

The CSSP intends (as set out by UTCAH; *cf. supra*) to map and register national NGOs to:

*(...) strengthen the Technical and Organisational Capacity of Angolan NGOs, so that they become **legitimate and privileged government partners**, in providing public utility services to urban, peri-urban and rural communities,<sup>60</sup> (emphasis added).*

The abovementioned mapping involves an exhaustive verification of all NGO characteristics, with particular focus on existing and planned relationships with local and central government.<sup>61</sup>

Presented in these terms, the CSSP provoked negative reactions from some civil society activists,<sup>62</sup> which did not understand where the legitimacy of this type of institution 'pre-accrediting' NGOs originated, dealing with a structure comprising of some unelected NGOs (led by two international NGOs), appropriating unto themselves the right to evaluate national partners. The intention to 'pre-certify' NGOs as 'privileged and legitimate partners of government,' is tainted with an appearance of collaborationism, the age-old intention of control by government institutions, as well as an implicit measure of coercion given that all who could not meet the evaluation criteria

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<sup>59</sup> In contract between the *Programme of Support for NSAs/European Commission and OMUNGA Association, project n° 005/2008, "Quintas de debates"*, execution from November 12, 2008 - January 11, 2009, p.3.

<sup>60</sup> In a letter requesting a meeting from *Development Workshop* sent to all national NGOs, March 2, 2007. A copy of this letter is with the author, which has not been published anywhere.

<sup>61</sup> In *Inquérito para Entrevistas de Mapeamento das Organizações da Sociedade Civil Angolana*, directed to all national NGOs, March 2 2007.

<sup>62</sup> We can place activists such as Fernando Macedo or Luís Araújo here (expressing these opinions in conversations with the author); see chapter by Fernando Macedo in this volume.

(subjective and political) probably become illegitimate, and are consequently discriminated by donors and State administrative structures.

The plan to 'strengthen civil society' continues in other projects, such as the Centre for the Development of Angolan Partnerships, envisaging CSO capacity building. Again it involves DW and World Learning, and some national NGOs, where the main objective is funding civil society projects with finance from oil companies operating in Angola (some kind of Corporate Social Responsibility), an initiative originally launched by the European Union delegation, the Angolan government and USAID. Given the operational logic of the political economic system, obviously when some national NGOs began to highlight the urgent need to finance projects on human rights advocacy, the oil companies raised concerns, requesting that one understand the political constraints and undertakings of companies in this sector.<sup>63</sup>

Understood in these terms, the strategy of '*constructive engagement*' reveals itself as limited public criticism within politically acceptable parameters, which are imprecise, not official, but when in doubt, each organisation or activist adopts in what is effectively a self-censorship mechanism.

### **CSOs of Angola Unite!**

The new CSO strengthening strategy argues for unity within civil society, based on the belief that CSOs in Angola lack networking ability (that are substantive, continuous, medium to long term, on interconnected issues), be it at national level or with peers at regional or international levels.<sup>64</sup> The simplified argument, supported by international NGOs (which to a certain extent guide the process), believes that civil society is weak because it is divided.

While this ignores the responsibility of external partners in this deficit,<sup>65</sup> this approach favours a unifying structure for CSOs, which in its simplest expression argues for the strengthening of representative structures which allow CSOs (largely NGOs) to speak with one voice in its '*constructive engagement*' with State institutions. Without specifying that unity between CSOs should be established on the basis of shared principles (e.g. unquestioned and unconditional defence of human rights), and which should not impose itself, or substitute individual CSOs, nor make decisions beyond its basic principles and statutes, unity could quickly become homogenisation, uniformity, and subordination of the most critical voices.

Based on this, some organisations and activists challenged the call for unity of civil society allied to a strategy of '*constructive engagement*'. Given that governmental structures believe CSOs should abstain from involvement in political issues, the above strategy in the medium term, has a double impact: firstly, adopting an increasingly technical approach, aid-delivery oriented, sectoral (action through thematic networks - HIV, environment, civic education, etc.), and apolitical activity by 'legitimate government partners'; secondly, a homogenisation of discourse and approaches which

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<sup>63</sup> In this regard, see chapter by Carlos Figueiredo in this volume.

<sup>64</sup> On this deficit, see Vidal, Nuno, "Social Neglect...op. cit., pp. 200-235.

<sup>65</sup> This does not take into account that project by project involvement and short-term priorities of donors and international NGOs, the imposition of agendas which change according to the whims of international developmentalists and their preferential relations with some internal partners, has fragmented more than united Angolan CSOs; See Vidal, Nuno, *Angola: Preconditions for Elections...op. cit.*; also "Country profile Angola" in *An Assessment*, op. cit., pp.47-62.

facilitate the subjugation of independent NGO individual positions through collective federal and representative structures, more easily co-opted and manipulated by political power. In practice, this constructive engagement and representative structures end up aligned with the fundamental principles of the patrimonial and clientelistic system, which lead to inequality, poverty and injustice. It also provides a cover, which leaves untouched the structural change that would have to be made to address the real causes of serious social problems.<sup>66</sup>

From a government perspective, 'constructive engagement' and unification as outlined above, are naturally very welcome. It is a more efficient and sophisticated way to soften the critics, as it depends on the self-initiative and collaboration of those who promote it (national and international NGOs). Above all, it is a cheaper strategy in comparison to that of 'parallel CSOs', first founded in the 1990s and now recognised as having been designed to undermine the independence of civil society in this regard.

Two contradictory positions have emerged within CSOs (principally NGOs) between those favouring a 'reformist' strategy (believing that one could reform institutions from within, collaborating with governmental structures in various projects), and those who believe that engagement with governmental structures should be selective and cautious, based on principles which respect human rights that should never be sacrificed, while always protecting the right to CSO political opinion and expression. This politically conscious position is more critical, than cooperative.<sup>67</sup> Characterisation of the two contrary perspectives appear within international organisations' reports, in somewhat exaggerated and simplistic terms, as a separation of 'overly radical' CSOs from the 'authentic and sensible' ones<sup>68</sup> -- with the most sensible being the 'reformists': a Manichaeian characterisation which denigrates positions contrary to 'constructive engagement' and the unifying representativeness of civil society, that exacerbate existing divisions.

The process associated with the National Civil Society Conference, reflects these different view points within CSOs and the involvement of international organisations in the issue. Although dispersed, the process was driven initially by the European Union delegation, with the active collaboration of international NGOs, *Development Workshop*, *World Learning* and *CARE* (among others). The 1<sup>st</sup> Angolan National Civil Society Conference, November 6-8, 2007, adopted the theme 'to Construct Unity in Diversity' at the outset, with the following objectives: 'to improve knowledge of each other [CSOs], and thus capacity to coordinate civil society efforts so as to promote national development'.<sup>69</sup>

The reformist perspective appears to have prevailed from reading the conference recommendations, emphasising the importance of civil society national 'representation' through a strengthening of FONGA (Forum of Angolan NGOs), a structure and space for articulation and

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<sup>66</sup> Regarding criticism of constructive engagement and homogenised and apolitical civil society representation, see chapter by Fernando Macedo in this volume; also chapters by Sérgio Calundungo critiquing the perspective of a politically sterilised civil society, and Fernando Pacheco critiquing homogenised representation.

<sup>67</sup> See interview extracts with Luís Araújo in Vidal, Nuno, "Landmines of Democracy: Civil Society and the Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Angola" in Minnie, Jeanette (ed.), *Outside the Ballot Box...op. cit.*, pp. 65-87.

<sup>68</sup> See Amundsen, Inge & Abreu, Cesaltina, *Civil Society in Angola: Inroads, Space and Accountability*, a Christian Michelsen Institute Report (Bergen-Norway: CMI, 2006), footnote 27, p.18.

<sup>69</sup> In *Conclusões da Conferência Nacional da Sociedade Civil, 2007*, unpublished, p.1

bringing together positions of member NGOs, but which never represented the totality of Angolan NGOs:

*Rethink the role of FONGA as a coordination mechanism for national NGOs, paying special attention to national representation. This concerns relations with other platforms and the organisational expression of civil society in the provinces, municipalities and villages.<sup>70</sup>*

Other recommendations where the prevalence of the reformist position was evident, while referring to the need to unite, state that it is equally necessary to collaborate with government and represent civil society through constructive engagement:

*It is necessary to guarantee quality civil society representation within the councils being created at different levels. Autonomous constructive engagement with the government is essential to avail of this space for dialogue and negotiation.<sup>71</sup>*

The 2<sup>nd</sup> conference, held in Luanda from November 25-27 2008 (without FONGA which had withdrawn from the process due to criticism about its inability to prepare and organise the conference), again highlights differing opinions. On one side are those more disposed to intense and dutiful articulation with government, through civil society representative structures and mechanisms; on the other are those expressing strong reservations about the possible manipulation of structures that monopolise civil society representation, disconnected from its original roots and associates, losing legitimacy and becoming easy prey for potential cooptation by political power. While not questioning the need for some articulation with government and state institutions, these latter opinions called attention to the need to impose conditions on such relationship, namely to ensure that CSO autonomy, its principles and philosophy for action remained absolute, thus avoiding cooptation. They also pointed to the need to bring past errors to an end, such as civil society structures without legitimacy, transparency or constituency, of restricted enclaves of opinion and analysis from within closed elitist circles, characterised by much external interference.<sup>72</sup>

Opposition to a 'reformist' stance (from both national and international NGOs) is clearly in the minority, with less ability to influence, less support and means. Even so, contrary to what one would expect, given the prevalence of a reformist position (with strong support from the donor community and a majority of followers from national and international NGOs), one does not see appeasement from those in power. Quite the opposite in fact, the more CSOs offer concessions and smooth cooperation, the more determined the government becomes in the process. This can be seen in the veiled threat of rendering illegal those national and international NGOs that have caused greatest political discomfort to government (*Open-Society Angola, Mãos Livres, AJPD and SOS Habitat*<sup>73</sup>), the banning of *MPalabanda* in Cabinda, in constraints to *media* activity, (including prison

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<sup>70</sup> In *Conclusões da Conferência Nacional da Sociedade Civil*, 2007, unpublished, point 3, line a), i, p.2.

<sup>71</sup> In *Conclusões da Conferência Nacional da Sociedade Civil*, 2007, unpublished, point 3, line g), p.3.

<sup>72</sup> The author participated in the II National Civil Society Conference, collaborated in preparing the methodology and organisation of discussion, and edited the final report; see Vidal, Nuno, *Relatório da II Conferência Angolana da Sociedade Civil, 2008/2009* (Luanda: Grupo de Coordenação da Sociedade Civil, July 2009).

<sup>73</sup> In statements to RNA, 13:00 hrs news programme, July 10 2007, and repeated by *Jornal de Angola*, edition 10812, p.3, July 11 2007, the Director General of UTCAH accused Open Society, AJPD, Mãos Livres and SOS Habitat of conducting activities outside the law, inciting disorder and disobedience to government among the population and state institutions, and of carrying out activities reserved to political parties, in a clear prelude to a process that could render them illegal, if pursued; see the article by Mário Paiva in the weekly paper *A Capital* (Luanda: Luanda, July 14 2007); also article by Reginaldo Silva in *Angolense* (Luanda: July 14, 2007).

sentences for journalists,<sup>74</sup> and maintaining restrictions on Radio Ecclesia's expansion outside Luanda), or even closure of UNHROA, the United Nations Human Rights Office Angola (directly contradicting government commitments to work more closely with UNHROA, made when Angola ran for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council in 2007,<sup>75</sup> and despite the strategy of constructive engagement adopted by the office during its last years in Angola<sup>76</sup>).

### **Conclusion: the institutionalisation of modern patrimonialism in Angola**

It was understood early on, that in spite of the new legal framework of 1991-92, the old political and economic power holders would do everything to resist change within decision making centres and in controlling the State apparatus.

The need for international political legitimacy effectively 'obliges' the existing system to allow for the functioning of mechanisms of a democratic and legal system, including human rights, but within limits which do not threaten the fundamental interests of the governing power and its *modus operandi*. An Institutionalist strategy of development assistance, as currently prevails in Angola, perfectly respects these limits, representing an apolitical 'partnership', subordinated and complicit. It supports the national and international legitimisation of the regime, improving its democratic image and leaving untouched the principle of patrimonial appropriation, and the control of public resources by a minority who hold political power. We are here dealing with the institutionalisation of modern patrimonialism as set out in part I of this chapter.

Such a system is contrary to any concept of development, as currently understood. The international image in the Western media, financed by the regime (e.g. CNN and Bloomberg)<sup>77</sup> of a growing country, on the road to modernisation, development, progress and democratisation (with growth rates of between 16-20%, and GDP per capita of \$1,400),<sup>78</sup> is far from the reality for the majority of the population. Apart from the mineral sector (oil and diamonds), internal production has grown very little, and the country depends heavily on the importation of basic foods items and services.<sup>79</sup> The mechanisms to divert public resources crystallised during the war were redirected

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<sup>74</sup> This was the case with Graça Campos, journalist and chief editor of *Semanário Angolense* and Fernando Lelo, *Voice of America* Cabindan correspondent, imprisoned in November 2007, accused of 'instigating rebellion' and crimes against the State. He was condemned to 12 years in prison, but freed on August 20, 2009 for lack of evidence.

<sup>75</sup> U.S. State Department. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, *2008 Human Rights Report Angola* Accessed at [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>76</sup> See Vidal, Nuno, "Sectores Sociais, Sociedade Civil, Política e Direitos Humanos em Angola" in Vidal, Nuno & Pinto de Andrade, Justino (eds.), *Sociedade Civil e Política em Angola* (Luanda e Lisboa: Firmamento, 2008), pp. 11-40.

<sup>77</sup> See *Angola; do you recognize this nation?*, Peninsula Press, advertising supplement, May/June 2009, located at [www.peninsula-press.com](http://www.peninsula-press.com)

<sup>78</sup> See *World Bank Country Brief - Angola*, located at <http://go.worldbank.org/6LIK1A3SS0>; Russell, Alec, "Investors sign up to Angola's miracle" (*Financial Times*, August 22, 2007); Della Barba, Mariana, "A África que prospera: Angola vive 'milagre económico' Exportações de petróleo atraem investimentos, mudam a paisagem de Luanda e fazem PIB crescer 23% em 2007", in *O Estado de São Paulo* (December 18 2007); also Hodges, Tony, "The Economic Foundations of the Patrimonial State" in Chabal, Patrick & Vidal, Nuno, *Angola, the weight of history* (London: Hurst, 2007), pp. 175-199.

<sup>79</sup> See article by Justino Pinto de Andrade in *A Capital* (Luanda: May 26 2007), p.13; also AfDB/OECD, *African Economic Outlook, Angola*, May 2007, pp.107-120, at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/16/38561655.pdf>; also Hodges, Tony, "The Economic Foundations of the Patrimonial State" in Chabal, Patrick & Vidal, Nuno, *Angola, the weight of history* (London: Hurst, 2007), pp. 175-199.

to benefit the national reconstruction process, according to The US State Department 2008 Human Rights Report:

*Government corruption was widespread, and accountability was limited due to a lack of checks and balances, lack of institutional capacity, and a culture of impunity. Despite the widespread perception that government corruption at all levels was endemic, there were no public investigations or prosecutions of government officials (...) SONANGOL's dual role as governmental regulator and national oil company hindered transparency in the petroleum sector. (...) Serious transparency problems remained in the diamond industry. (...) The business climate continued to favour those connected to the government; government ministers and other high-level officials commonly and openly owned interests in companies regulated by or doing business with their respective ministries. There were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest. (...) There were credible reports of high-level officials receiving substantial kickbacks from private companies awarded government contracts.<sup>80</sup>*

Similarly the mechanisms of repression, authoritarianism and disrespect for human rights are maintained. According to the same report:

*(...) there were numerous and serious problems. Human rights abuses included: the abridgement of citizens' right to elect officials at all levels; unlawful killings by police, military, and private security forces; security force torture, beatings, and rape; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; official corruption and impunity; judicial inefficiency and lack of independence; lengthy pre-trial detention; lack of due process; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association; forced evictions without compensation; and discrimination, violence, and abuse perpetrated against women and children.<sup>81</sup>*

The majority of the population live below the poverty line (approximately 70% of the population live on less than \$2 per day) and the country is 162<sup>nd</sup> on the UN Human Development Index (having fallen one place from the previous report).<sup>82</sup> In relation to the Gender-related Development Index (GDI), the country is 142<sup>nd</sup> of 157 countries, and inequality continues to be acute.<sup>83</sup> The first two

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<sup>80</sup> In U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, *2008 Human Rights Report Angola* Accessed at [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov); also report by Rafael Marques denouncing "generalised practices in Angola", where State officials at the highest levels of Government, in the Judicial system (including the Attorney-General and the presiding judge of the Angolan Military Supreme Court), Angolan Armed Forces, National Police, National Assembly and even in the Presidency of the Republic, combine their public duties with private interests; Marques, Rafael, "The Business Activities of the Attorney-General of the Republic", in *Semanário Angolense*, n° 329 (15-21 August 2009).

<sup>81</sup> U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, *2008 Human Rights Report Angola* located at [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>82</sup> See *Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting climate change: human solidarity: human solidarity in a divided world* (New York: UNDP, 2008); *Human Development Report 2006, Beyond scarcity: power, poverty and the global water crisis* (New York: UNDP, 2006), classifying Angola in 161<sup>st</sup> position; also Carvalho, Paulo de, "Desenvolvimento Humano em Angola", in Vidal, Nuno and Pinto de Andrade, Justino, *Sociedade Civil e Política em Angola, enquadramento regional e internacional* (Lisboa e Luanda: Firmamento, Universidade de Coimbra e Universidade Católica de Angola, 2008), pp. 221-231; also IMF Public Information Notice. *IMF Executive Board concludes 2007 Article IV Consultation with Angola*, September 13 2007, located at [www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org).

<sup>83</sup> *Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting climate change: human solidarity: human solidarity in a divided world* (New York: UNDP, 2008); also Pereira, Aline, "Género, Mercado de Trabalho e Sociedade Civil", in Vidal, Nuno and Pinto de Andrade, Justino, *Sociedade Civil e Política em Angola, enquadramento regional e internacional* (Lisboa & Luanda: Firmamento, Universidade de Coimbra e Universidade Católica de Angola, 2008), pp. 181-196.



national reports on progress towards the *Millennium Development Goals*, in 2003 and 2005, concluded that at the present rate, the country would fail to meet the objective for 2015; there is weak progress regarding almost all objectives, and a dubious possibility that they will be fulfilled.<sup>84</sup>

Confronting this reality from a neo-liberal and technical bureaucratic perspective, with social-democratic finery (e.g. Millennium Declaration, MDGs, Cotonou Agreement, PAANE, Constructive Engagement, PRCSC, etc.), through apparent State institutional strengthening, which does not address the fundamental issues of the existing political and economic system and its international relations, contributes nothing to real development. Nor does it offer hope for substantive change in the lives of the Angolan poor, the majority. The opposite is the case: we are dealing with cynical complicity in maintaining and strengthening the current situation, the prevailing *status quo*.

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<sup>84</sup> *The UN System in Angola MDG Strategy Outline, Draft 2, Work in Progress*, March 2007, p.3; also, *Angola, Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio, relatório de progresso 2005* (Luanda: Angolan government and PNUD, 2005); *Angola, Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio, relatório MDG/NEPAD 2003* (Luanda: Angolan government, Ministry of Planning, UN System in Angola, 2003).